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FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND THE LIMITS 
OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
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The ability to confront witnesses through cross-examination is conventionally understood 
as the most powerful means of testing evidence, and one of the most important features of 
the adversarial trial. Popularly feted, cross-examination was immortalised in John Henry 
Wigmore’s (1863–1943) famous dictum that it is ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth’. Through a detailed review of the cross-examination of a 
forensic scientist, in the first scientifically-informed challenge to latent fingerprint 
evidence in Australia, this article offers a more modest assessment of its value. Drawing 
upon mainstream scientific research and advice, and contrasting scientific knowledge 
with answers obtained through cross-examination of a latent fingerprint examiner, it 
illuminates a range of serious and apparently unrecognised limitations with our current 
procedural arrangements. The article explains the limits of cross-examination and the 
difficulties trial and appellate judges — and by extension juries — experience when 
engaging with forensic science evidence. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth. … [C]ross-examination, not trial by jury, is 
the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to 
improved methods of trial procedure.1 
The adversarial trial process is predicated on the efficacy of cross-examination 
as an ‘engine … for the discovery of truth’.2 As Wigmore’s quote demonstrates, 
common law scholars have not been shy about ascribing near mystical powers 
to skilled cross-examination. This article offers a critical re-assessment of the 
trust that orthodox legal doctrine places in the efficacy of cross-examination, 
specifically in respect of the challenge of identifying and conveying significant 
problems with forensic science evidence. 
 
 1 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, ed James H Chadbourn (Little, 
Brown and Company, rev ed, 1974) vol 5, 32. 
 2 Ibid. 
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In this article, we build on a growing body of scholarship about these 
problems, including work that documents the failure of legal processes to 
identify and counter problems with forensic science evidence. In order to 
illustrate how cross-examination fails to serve its supposed function as an 
engine for truth, we present a case study: an unsuccessful challenge to the 
probative value of latent fingerprint evidence. Our study — based on R v JP3 
and (on appeal) JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)4 (collectively  
‘JP ’) — suggests that cross-examination is not necessarily effective in 
influencing fact-finders’ assessment of the probative value of expert opinions 
in criminal proceedings. This is so even when, as in this instance, the cross-
examination was well-prepared and directed at forensic science testimony 
that was exaggerated, misleading and failed to incorporate or address relevant 
scientific knowledge. 
The frailties of cross-examination are not, of course, the only structural 
impediment to accurate fact determination in cases involving forensic science 
evidence. The ensuing analysis should be read in the context of weak 
admissibility standards, limited resourcing (especially for the defence), and 
increasing reliance on so-called trial safeguards such as rebuttal witnesses, 
admissibility compromises and judicial instructions. We have previously 
written, separately and collectively, about each of these problems.5 However, 
our analysis of the failures of cross-examination is important because it is 
inconsistent with orthodox legal commitment to the efficacy of cross-
examination as an ‘engine’ with the tendency to make criminal proceedings 
fair and the state, through its expert witnesses, accountable. 
This article explores the difficulties encountered by defendants, and their 
(usually publicly-funded) lawyers, when attempting to demonstrate non-
trivial limitations with forensic science evidence adduced by the state.6 Rather 
than rely exclusively on the interactions — the questions and particularly the 
responses — from the trial (and the voir dire), our analysis juxtaposes 
 
 3 R v JP (Children’s Court of New South Wales, Magistrate Mijovich, 27 January 2015) (‘JP 
(Trial)’). 
 4 JP v DPP (NSW) (2015) 256 A Crim R 447 (‘JP (Appeal)’). 
 5 See, eg, Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque, ‘The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the 
Frailty of the Criminal Trial’ (2012) 24(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51; Gary 
Edmond, ‘Forensic Science Evidence, Adversarial Criminal Proceedings, and Mainstream 
Scientific “Advice”’ in Darryl K Brown, Jenia I Turner and Bettina Weisser (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminal Process (Oxford University Press, 2019) 761. 
 6 The vast majority of forensic science expert evidence is adduced by the state: see Ian 
Freckelton et al, Expert Evidence and Criminal Jury Trials (Oxford University Press, 2016)  
8 [1.33]. 
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responses from the transcript with scientific research and authoritative 
scientific pronouncements. This method allows us to contrast the testimony 
from the proceedings with what is known about forensic science evidence in 
academic, scientific and policy realms beyond the courtroom. We consider 
these academic, scientific and policy perspectives to be the benchmark of 
institutional knowledge regarding the forensic sciences. Our approach enables 
the reader to observe conspicuous differences between the trial evidence and 
this benchmark, as well as the inability of participants, including the ‘expert’ 
witness and judicial officers, to appreciate their significance.7 
The issues canvassed in this article are particularly important for non-
DNA feature comparison procedures, such as latent fingerprints, ballistics, 
tool marks, handwriting and documents, shoe, tyre, paint, hair and fibre, soil, 
image, gait and voice comparison evidence. Mainstream scientific knowledge 
is rarely presented to the trier of fact in criminal prosecutions where evidence 
derived from these procedures is adduced and relied upon by the state.8 On 
the relatively rare occasions when methodological and other 
epistemologically destabilising issues are raised, our experience — which 
resonates with the course of events in the case study — suggests that it is 
unlikely that those issues will be understood or taken seriously.9 Further, 
judicial intervention at trial — most likely to manifest through the provision 
of directions and instructions on evidence and the burden of proof — is 
unlikely to assist with problems. Such interventions are rarely informed by 
scientifically-based insights or methodological sophistication. Rather, they 
tend to elide and obscure gaps between mainstream scientific research and 
conventional legal approaches to expert evidence. 
 
 7 The word ‘expert’ is in scare quotes or italics to indicate that the precise status or scope of 
expertise can sometimes seem to be problematic. 
 8 See generally Gary Edmond, David Hamer and Emma Cunliffe, ‘A Little Ignorance is a 
Dangerous Thing: Engaging with Exogenous Knowledge Not Adduced by the Parties’ (2016) 
25(3) Griffith Law Review 383. DNA profiling and some chemistry procedures, derived from 
the sciences, are exceptions, having largely emerged out of mainstream scientific inquiry: 
National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (National Academies Press, 2009) 40–1 (‘NRC Report’); David A Harris, Failed 
Evidence: Why Law Enforcement Resists Science (New York University Press, 2012) 5. This 
article is primarily focused on comparison procedures. 
 9 Consider the lack of engagement with scientific research across the growing number of voice 
comparison cases: Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; Tran v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79; 
Nguyen v The Queen (2017) 264 A Crim R 405; Chen v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 106 
(‘Chen’). Another recent example is the skilled but apparently ineffective cross-examination 
in Taub v The Queen (2017) 95 NSWLR 388, 400–2 [68]–[76] (Simpson JA), discussed in 
Gary Edmond and D Brynn Hibbert, ‘Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Inferences on 
Prohibited Drug Manufacture’ (2018) 42(4) Criminal Law Journal 208, 216–31. 
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For reasons explained in this article, our system of accusatorial trial has 
not managed scientific evidence well. This observation is particularly 
important given the increased state reliance on forensic science evidence in 
recent years. We argue that the criminal legal system’s stubborn persistence 
with traditional adversarial processes tends to blind judicial officers to 
knowledge, restricts the provision of feedback about accuracy and system 
performance, and thereby impedes institutional learning. Indeed, institutional 
inertia, hierarchical deference, technical illiteracy and institutional biases 
seem to make it difficult for judicial officers to recognise or respond to 
fundamental epistemic problems with forensic science evidence. 
A  A Case Study and a Few Caveats 
Our decision to focus on a single case permits us to demonstrate some of the 
failures suggested in the broader literature, but it simultaneously imposes 
methodological limitations. It might fairly be said, for example, that this case 
is not representative of contemporary litigation. This section therefore 
explains both our selection of JP and the reliance that we place upon it in the 
ensuing analysis. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, in Australia as in cognate 
jurisdictions, there have been relatively few challenges to (non-DNA) forensic 
science evidence, including latent fingerprint evidence.10 For a multitude of 
reasons, including resource constraints and a skills deficit at the criminal bar, 
methodologically sophisticated challenges to forensic science evidence are 
exceptionally rare. The infrequency of serious challenges does not reflect the 
validity and reliability of procedures (or methods) in regular use by the state. 
To the contrary, following a multi-year review of the forensic sciences, the 
National Research Council (the ‘NRC’) of the United States (‘US’) National  
 
 
 
 
 10 Most of the recent challenges to forensic science evidence in Australian courts have 
disproportionally focused on DNA profiling and the image interpretation: see, eg, Tran 
(1990) 50 A Crim R 233, 242–3 (McInerney J); R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; Pantoja (1996) 88 
A Crim R 554; R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462; Fitzgerald v 
The Queen (2014) 311 ALR 158; Tuite v The Queen (2015) 49 VR 196 (‘Tuite’); R v Tang 
(2006) 65 NSWLR 681 (‘Tang’); Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; Morgan v R 
(2011) 215 A Crim R 33; R v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83; Honeysett v The Queen (2013) 233 
A Crim R 152, revd (2014) 253 CLR 122 (‘Honeysett (High Court)’). 
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Academy of Sciences (the ‘Academy’), in its Strengthening Forensic Science in 
the United States: A Path Forward report (the ‘NRC Report ’), concluded: 
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific 
individual or source.11 
It is the exceptional nature of JP — a rare challenge to the long venerated 
‘science of fingerprint examination’12 — that makes this case both informative 
and revealing. 
The case of JP is illuminating because, more than a century after the 
introduction of latent fingerprint evidence, it represents the first sustained 
attempt to contest such evidence — both the procedures used and the 
strength of conclusions drawn — in an Australian criminal proceeding.13 JP is 
the first substantial challenge to the underlying procedures of finger print 
identification despite longstanding legal reliance, massive expansion of its 
usage, and technological developments. This relatively late challenge to latent 
fingerprint evidence comes on the heels of a series of recent authoritative 
scientific reviews (such as the NRC Report) that question fingerprint 
examiners’ methodology, expression of results, and routine exposure to 
domain-irrelevant information (such as the identity or criminal history of the 
suspect).14 Few of these issues had previously been raised or recognised in 
legal processes, despite routine reliance on latent fingerprint evidence as 
definitive proof of identity for more than a century. 
Close consideration of JP reveals ‘gaps’ between mainstream scientific 
knowledge and the information presented in expert reports and courtroom 
testimony. These gaps usually pass unrecognised within criminal litigation. 
Further, JP suggests that even when gaps are exposed, many forensic 
 
 11 NRC Report (n 8) 7; see also at 7–8. For an introduction and overview, see Gary Edmond, 
‘What Lawyers Should Know about the Forensic “Sciences”’ (2015) 36(1) Adelaide Law 
Review 33. 
 12 See Harris (n 8) 24; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Executive 
Office of the President, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of 
Feature-Comparison Methods (Report to the President, September 2016) 87 (‘PCAST 
Report ’). 
 13 For a comprehensive review, see Gary Edmond, ‘Latent Science: A History of Challenges to 
Fingerprint Evidence in Australia’ (2019) University of Queensland Law Journal 
(forthcoming) (‘Latent Science’). 
 14 Domain-irrelevant information is information that is not required to compare fingerprints: 
see below Part V(E)(1). 
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scientists, lawyers, and judges seem incapable of recognising their evidentiary 
implications for the case and beyond.15 This case is significant precisely 
because scientifically-informed challenges to routine forensic science 
evidence are unusual. Close attention reveals structural impediments to 
recognising, and taking seriously, issues, that are central to understanding the 
probative value of the expert opinion — notably, attending to validity, 
scientific reliability, uncertainty, error, human factors, impartiality and the 
way the opinion is expressed.16 The case clearly illustrates some of the 
difficulties encountered when actors within the legal system attempt to engage 
with, let alone understand, relevant scientific research and advice. 
Simultaneously, it casts light on conventional legal strategies and explanations 
employed by prosecutors, expert witnesses and judicial officers to resist the 
implications of inconvenient scientific knowledge. 
Our case is susceptible to analysis because it proceeded to trial, where it 
was decided by a judicial officer obliged to provide ‘reasons’.17 The trial 
decision was appealed, such that another judicial officer reviewed the verdict 
and the reasoning. Although trials and appeals are not uncommon, our 
criminal justice system depends overwhelmingly on guilty pleas.18 This 
structural reliance on pleas makes a case involving a well-prepared challenge 
to forensic science evidence even more of an outlier. A trial and appeal, and 
the semi-public records they generate, enable us to access and consider issues 
that routinely pass unrecognised in both plea negotiations and contested 
proceedings. The explicit challenge to the reliability of fingerprint 
identification evidence within the case affords a very rare opportunity to 
evaluate how courts engage with issues that are not usually disclosed  
or considered. 
 
 15 Contrast responses from judicial officers conversant with the issues: Judge Harry T Edwards, 
‘Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community’ (2009) 50 (Fall) 
Jurimetrics 5; Judge Nancy Gertner, ‘Commentary on “The Need for a Research Culture in 
the Forensic Sciences”’ (2011) 58(3) UCLA Law Review 789; Justice Ian Binnie, ‘Science in 
the Courtroom: The Mouse That Roared’ (2007) 56 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 
307. 
 16 See generally Kristy A Martire and Gary Edmond, ‘Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence’ 
(2017) 40(3) Melbourne University Law Review 967. 
 17 Although, the record could hardly be considered public. This is yet another problem with 
transparency, public accountability and feedback for our legal institutions. 
 18 See Geraldine MacKenzie, Andrew Vincent and John Zeleznikow, ‘Negotiating about 
Charges and Pleas: Balancing Interests and Justice’ (2015) 24(4) Group Decision and 
Negotiation 577; Australian Institute of Criminology, Plea Negotiations: An Empirical Analysis 
(Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 544, April 2018) 1. 
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Critics might try to defend cross-examination by denigrating the 
performance of the publicly-funded lawyer in this particular trial (and 
appeal). It might be said that any failings with the cross-examination were the 
result of inexperience or the particular tactics employed.19 We believe such 
interpretations are difficult to sustain. By juxtaposing scientific knowledge 
and recommendations with extracts from the proceedings, we intend to allow 
the transcript to speak for itself. For those defending the status quo, recourse 
to inexperience or tactical mistakes as some kind of justification or 
explanation for failure in well-prepared challenges has system destabilising 
implications.20 How often, we might wonder, is the primary trial safeguard 
ineffective or less effective than it ought to be? And, what are those who 
defend the status quo doing to address weak performances? Moreover, what 
are the ‘appropriate’ tactics in JP, and why should guilt or innocence depend 
on such subtleties? We also wonder about the tactical genius of the large 
number of very experienced legal practitioners (some now senior judges) who 
did not raise, and presumably did not appreciate, the very serious 
methodological problems with forensic science evidence they seemed to have 
accepted at face value or raised perfunctorily in circumstances where clients 
protested their innocence.21 Defence of prevailing practices perpetuates 
ignorance and inconsistency in a system that purports to be fair and 
consistent in its dispensation of justice. 
Finally, it is not our intention to engage in ad hominem criticism of the 
expertise and sincerity of the latent fingerprint examiner who appeared in JP. 
This particular latent fingerprint examiner appears to have been selected to 
testify because he was the senior examiner in the region encompassing 
Dubbo, where the offence and prosecution took place. We accept that he can 
analyse and compare fingerprints in ways that are superior to lay persons.22 
We do not contend that his testimony is insincere. The witness frankly 
 
 19 Here, there is the risk of victim blaming, to the extent that a defendant is deemed responsible 
for tactical decisions. 
 20 To use the words of Albert W Alschuler (albeit in the context of plea bargains), such mistakes 
or failures of experience represent ‘tactical decision[s] irrelevant to any proper objective of 
criminal proceedings’: Albert W Alschuler, ‘Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to 
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System’ (1983) 50(3) University of Chicago Law 
Review 931, 932. 
 21 Some proportion of these clients will have been innocent. 
 22 See Matthew B Thompson, Jason M Tangen and Duncan J McCarthy, ‘Expertise in 
Fingerprint Identification’ (2013) 58(6) Journal of Forensic Sciences 1519; Jason M Tangen, 
Matthew B Thompson and Duncan J McCarthy, ‘Identifying Fingerprint Expertise’ 22(8) 
Psychological Science 995. 
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acknowledged that he was unfamiliar with a variety of scientific materials and 
all of the opinions he expressed in response to the challenge to his evidence 
might have been sincerely held. There are few reasons to believe that the 
testimony reported below is not representative of perspectives that are widely 
held by members of his community.23 
Our primary concern is with the question of whether testimony proffered 
by forensic practitioners, called and relied upon by the state, provides 
decision-makers with accurate information and the ability to evaluate it.24 Do 
those called by the state, and recognised as experts by the courts, testify in 
terms consistent with what is known on the basis of scientific research about 
latent fingerprint examination? In the terms of our evidence law, are their 
opinions based on ‘knowledge’?25 Much of the testimony reproduced below 
demonstrates: a lack of knowledge; indifference to scientific research, 
methods and advice; and a preference for longstanding assumptions, beliefs, 
commitments and impressions pervasive among latent fingerprint examiners. 
This preference may be difficult to reconcile with the goals, rules and needs of 
the criminal legal system. 
It is precisely here where our system seems to fail — because, in the case of 
JP, the decision-makers did not seem to understand that scientific knowledge 
undermined to some degree the probative value of the fingerprint evidence.26 
To be clear, it is not that latent fingerprint evidence is without probative value, 
but rather that the opinion is less conclusive than is suggested by the 
prosecutor, the fingerprint examiner and, in the end, the judicial officers. In a 
prosecution that turns on latent fingerprint evidence, this observation 
required serious consideration in relation to the burden and standard of 
proof. Our case study is both exceptional and helpful because it brings these 
issues to the fore. 
 
 23 The fingerprint examiner was using a standardised reporting template: see Gary Edmond, 
Kristy Martire and Mehera San Roque, ‘Expert Reports and the Forensic Sciences’ (2017) 
40(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 590, 602–3, 627–37. 
 24 Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34, 40 
(Lord President Cooper) (‘Davie’); Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 
705, 741 [81] (Heydon JA) (‘Makita’), quoting Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1, 3–4 
(Anderson J); Gary Edmond, ‘Forensic Science Evidence and the Conditions for Rational 
(Jury) Evaluation’ (2015) 39(1) Melbourne University Law Review 77. 
 25 In Honeysett (High Court) (n 10), the High Court accepted the definition of ‘knowledge’ as 
‘acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or investigation’: at 131 [23] 
(French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) (emphasis omitted). 
 26 Or, expressing the terminology of IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300 (‘IMM’) — it was 
weaker than suggested by the witness. 
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II   A DV E R S A R IA L  TR IA L S,  TR IA L  SA F E G UA R D S  A N D   
CR O S S-EX A M I NAT IO N 
In the adversarial tradition, courts allocate primary responsibility for 
assembling and presenting evidence to the parties.27 In accusatorial 
proceedings, the state bears the burden of proving the elements of a criminal 
offence beyond reasonable doubt. In theory, the state, through prosecutors, 
has a special obligation to present ‘credible evidence … firmly and pressed to 
its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly’.28 While the defence has 
various obligations (which have been expanding over time), in practice, its 
actions are typically responsive.29 Resource constraints, along with pervasive 
beliefs about the accuracy of forensic science evidence, place considerable 
pressure on defendants and their publicly-funded lawyers to enter an early 
guilty plea, or limit challenges to forensic science evidence to cross-
examination at trial.30 Most criminal defendants (and their lawyers) do not 
have access to an expert witness, or even expert advice, when considering 
their plea or preparing a defence. 
For the tiny proportion of cases that make it to trial, legal rules and 
procedures are intended to make proceedings fair and outcomes both 
consistent and accurate. When expert evidence is presented at trial, 
admissibility rules and procedures, such as cross-examination, are considered 
to be appropriate and implicitly effective ways of testing expert opinions. The 
 
 27 Patrick Devlin, The Judge (University of Chicago Press, 1981) 60–1:  
The English say that the best way of getting at the truth is to have each party dig for the 
facts that help it; between them they will bring all to light. … [T]wo prejudiced searchers 
starting from opposite ends of the field will between them be less likely to miss anything 
than the impartial searcher starting in the middle.  
  Cf John H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press,  
2003) 8:  
The development of adversary criminal trial raised an acute theoretical challenge, which 
has never been satisfactorily resolved in the Anglo-American tradition: how to justify the 
truth-impairing tendencies of a procedure that remits to partisans the work of gathering 
and presenting the evidence upon which accurate adjudication depends. 
 28 Boucher v The Queen [1955] SCR 16, 23–4 (Rand J). 
 29 In recent years, new expectations have been placed on defendants, notably in relation to 
alibis, calling expert evidence and silence: see, eg, Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) 
Act 2013 (NSW); Criminal Procedure Amendment (Mandatory Pre-Trial Defence Disclosure) 
Act 2013 (NSW). 
 30 See Gary Edmond et al, ‘Contextual Bias and Cross-Contamination in the Forensic Sciences: 
The Corrosive Implications for Investigations, Plea Bargains, Trials and Appeals’ (2015) 14(1) 
Law, Probability & Risk 1, 20–1; John B Bishop, Prosecution without Trial (Butterworths, 
1989) 184. 
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following statement, from an influential US Supreme Court decision on  
the admissibility of scientific evidence, conveys this pervasive common  
law attitude: 
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.31 
Like many of the so-called trial safeguards, cross-examination is 
conventionally feted.32 Its value to the truth-seeking function of trials is 
widely asserted, including when contested expert opinion evidence is 
admitted. The reality is often remote from such lofty valorisation. Cross-
examination can be a very effective tool; however, even a well prepared cross-
examination may fail to serve its intended purpose. And, of course, in a 
context in which the state’s forensic evidence is rarely tested, it is worth 
observing that tools can only be effective to the extent that they are  
actually used. 
Judges rarely reflect on some of the practical constraints limiting the cross-
examination of experts. In addition to the actual opinion, it is contingent 
upon: (1) the ability and resources available to the cross-examiner; and (2) the 
knowledge, experience, honesty, resilience and persuasiveness of the witness; 
and (3) decision-makers appreciating the significance — however complex or 
methodologically subtle — of questions and answers, concessions, 
recalcitrance and ignorance. In many cases, and perhaps most cases involving 
forensic comparison procedures, these contingencies tend to assist the 
prosecutor and the state, thereby contributing to the disadvantages 
confronting the frequently impecunious and technically-illiterate defendant.33 
For, where one or more of these contingencies ‘fails’, the resulting risk of 
misuse of evidence falls disproportionally upon defendants. 
 
 
 
 31 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 US 579, 596 (Blackmun J for Blackmun, 
White, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas JJ) (1993) (‘Daubert ’). The formal 
requirement of ‘reliability’ and willingness to admit ‘shaky’ evidence sit uncomfortably 
together in Daubert. Though, we should not forget that Daubert was an appeal from a civil 
case. See also Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305, 305–6, 309–11 (Scalia J for Scalia, 
Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg JJ) (2009). 
 32 See Wigmore (n 1) 32; Edmond and San Roque (n 5) 51–3. 
 33 See NRC Report (n 8) 53. 
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A review of empirical studies, focused on the ability of cross-examination 
to expose weaknesses in expert opinion evidence, concluded: 
[S]tudies have found little or no ability of cross-examination to undo the effects 
of an expert’s testimony on direct-examination, even if the direct testimony is 
fraught with weaknesses and the cross is well designed to expose those 
weaknesses. … [I]t is unlikely that defence cross-examination … will reduce 
the impact of the forensic expert witness’s direct testimony.34 
Similarly, a report prepared by the Law Commission for England and Wales 
questioned conventional commitment to trial safeguards: 
Cross-examination, the adduction of contrary expert evidence and judicial 
guidance at the end of the trial are currently assumed to provide sufficient 
safeguards in relation to expert evidence … However, … it is doubtful whether 
these are valid assumptions.35 
This article offers an empirical instantiation of these laboratory studies and 
reviews. Our case study demonstrates that rather than operating as an engine 
for exposing weakness and uncovering truth, the impact of cross-examination 
is inconsistent and often banal.36 Faith in cross-examination may blind legal 
participants to limitations with opinion evidence and system constraints. 
Nevertheless, the ability to ‘test’ incriminating expert opinion evidence 
through cross-examination remains one of the primary justifications for 
liberal approaches to the admission of ‘shaky’ incriminating opinion evidence, 
as well as confidence in the fairness of criminal proceedings and the safety  
of verdicts. 
 
 34 Dawn McQuiston-Surrett and Michael J Saks, ‘The Testimony of Forensic Identification 
Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear’ (2009) 33(5) Law and 
Human Behavior 436, 439 (citations omitted). See also Margaret Bull Kovera et al, ‘Expert 
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of Expert Testimony and Cross-
Examination’ (1994) 18(6) Law and Human Behavior 653. 
 35 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Report No 
325, 21 March 2011) 5 [1.20] (citations omitted); see also at 6 [1.24]. See also NRC Report  
(n 8) 53. 
 36 Michael Lynch and David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at the 
Iran–Contra Hearings (Duke University Press, 1996) 151–3; Jules Epstein, ‘The Great Engine 
that Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination’ 
(2007) 36(3) Stetson Law Review 727. 
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III   A  B R I E F  OV E RV I E W  O F  LAT E N T  F I N G E R P R I N T   
J U R I S P RU D E N C E  I N  A U S T R A L IA 
[I]t may be the safest of all evidence.37 
Latent fingerprint evidence is admissible and regularly admitted in Australian 
courtrooms.38 It was first admitted at the beginning of the twentieth century 
and was quickly accepted as sufficient to support proof beyond reasonable 
doubt where the question of identity was in issue.39 From its origins in the 
Anglo-American criminal justice system — and predating DNA profiling and 
studies of forensic feature comparison procedures (eg ballistic, bite mark, hair, 
fibre, shoe, voice, foot and tyre comparisons) — latent fingerprint 
examination has equated the ‘matching’ of two fingerprints with the positive 
identification of a specific person.40 Categorical identification, also known as 
‘individualisation’, was sometimes supplemented with the locution to the 
exclusion of all others.41 Positive identification is based on a pervasive 
commitment to fingerprints being both unique and permanent, and the 
related contention that when two fingerprints match, they were produced by 
the same finger. Significantly, the issues in JP concerned the probative value of 
the match decision — that is, how should match decisions be reported, and 
what does a match decision mean in relation to proof of identity? 
Given what follows, it might be considered disconcerting that there have 
been so few serious challenges to the validity and scientific reliability of latent 
 
 37 R v Parker [1912] VLR 152, 158 (Hodges J) (‘Parker’). See also R v Blacker (1910) 10 SR 
(NSW) 357, 360 (Cullen CJ). 
 38 For those interested in developments in other jurisdictions, see Gary Edmond et al, 
‘Admissibility Compared: The Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (ie, Forensic 
Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions’ (2013) 3 University of Denver Criminal Law 
Review 31. 
 39 See, eg, Parker (n 37). The question on reserve, confirmed by the majority, was whether a 
single latent fingerprint match could support guilt. The Chief Justice dissented: at 153–6 
(Madden CJ); however, all of the judges agreed that the claim that fingerprints are unique 
should not have been admitted: at 155 (Madden CJ), 158 (Hodges J), 159 (Cussen J).  
See also Jeremy Gans, ‘A Tale of Two High Court Forensic Cases’ (2011) 33(3) Sydney Law 
Review 515. 
 40 See, eg, People v Jennings, 96 NE 1077, 1081–2 (Ill Sup Ct, 1911). For historical accounts of 
fingerprinting, see Simon A Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal 
Identification (Harvard University Press, 2001); Chandak Sengoopta, Imprint of the Raj: How 
Fingerprinting Was Born in Colonial India (Macmillan, 2003). 
 41 Cf Michael J Saks and Jonathan J Koehler, ‘The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence’ (2008) 61(1) Vanderbilt Law Review 199; Simon A Cole, ‘Individualization is Dead, 
Long Live Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the 
United States’ (2014) 13(2) Law, Probability & Risk 117. 
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fingerprint evidence. We encourage readers to search the law reports and legal 
databases for themselves.42 The dearth of epistemologically-informed 
challenges is revealing because the first ever independent validation studies of 
the procedures used by latent fingerprint examiners were conducted after 
2009, in response to criticisms expressed by the NRC Report.43 This dearth is 
interesting because the basic procedure employed by contemporary latent 
fingerprint examiners (Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation and Verification, 
known as ACE-V) was described as early as 1959.44 While some of the 
methods used to locate, develop, document and analyse prints have been 
refined, comparison of latent fingerprints continues to depend on subjective 
interpretations by human examiners.45 As technical practices and equipment 
changed during the course of the 20th century, fingerprint examiners did not 
rigorously evaluate their new procedures, develop probabilistic means of 
expressing results, or attempt to manage risks to their subjective analyses.46 
Simultaneously, lawyers did not seek information, nor actively challenge 
traditional assumptions or new techniques and interpretations. The use of 
algorithms to search rapidly expanding electronic databases did not generate 
jurisprudence that addressed their implications for practice or the way ‘match’ 
opinions ought to be expressed. This is curious because some developments, 
such as the increasing use of databases, introduced new risks of adventitious 
matches, as the number of prints, and the number of similar-looking prints, 
rapidly increased. Moreover, many of the developments were occurring as 
courts were beginning to grapple with how biologists, population geneticists 
and statisticians might present the results of DNA profiling in probabilistic 
 
 42 See Edmond, ‘Latent Science’ (n 13). 
 43 NRC Report (n 8) 53, 142–3, 184. See also PCAST Report (n 12) 87, 91–5. See, eg, Bradford T 
Ulery et al, ‘Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent Fingerprint Examiners’ 
(2012) 7(3) PLoS One e32800:1–12; Tangen, Thompson and McCarthy (n 22). 
 44 NRC Report (n 8) 137. See also RA Huber, ‘Expert Witnesses: In Defence of Expert Witnesses 
in General and of Document Examiners in Particular’ (1959) 2(3) Criminal Law Quarterly 
276. See generally David R Ashbaugh, Quantitative–Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An 
Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology (CRC Press, 1999). 
 45 See Simon A Cole and Andrew Roberts, ‘Certainty, Individualisation and the Subjective 
Nature of Expert Fingerprint Evidence’ [2012] (11) Criminal Law Review 824. 
 46 We do not suggest that there is a problem with subjective analyses per se, but practices need 
to be standardised and risks managed. See generally Expert Working Group on Human 
Factors in Latent Print Analysis, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach 
(Report, February 2012) (‘NIST Report’). 
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terms.47 Legal credulity contributed to the persistence of prescientific and 
non-scientific practices among latent fingerprint examiners and the police 
organisations that host them.48 
The few reported challenges in Australia, including a couple of 
exclusionary decisions, are not concerned with methods, validity, reliability, 
accuracy, error or bias. Rather, they are focused on the way reference prints 
were collected; latent fingerprint examiners transgressing legal boundaries (by 
offering opinions beyond identity, for example the age of a print or what a 
person was doing when a print was deposited); not providing images of the 
prints; and not identifying specific points of similarity.49 Others are focused 
on the failure of the trial judge to explain that a latent fingerprint matched to 
a particular person might have had an innocent origin.50 None of the 
Australian decisions call into question the underlying methods, the 
idiosyncratic way latent fingerprint examiners equate a match with positive 
identification, or the departure of practices from mainstream scientific 
research, methods and advice.51 
More cautious and qualified concerns about fingerprint evidence, 
expressed in earlier decisions at the beginning of the 20th century, have 
gradually been effaced.52 A decade ago, in a judgment endorsed on appeal, the 
Chief Justice of South Australia indicated that there was ‘no suggestion that 
the process of comparison … is not a recognised and appropriate process’.53 
The reliability, even practical infallibility, of fingerprint evidence seems to 
have been accepted, and promoted, by the courts through their 
accommodating practices. Components of a perverse feedback loop —  
 
 
 47 See, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, Forbes v The Queen [2010] HCATrans 120, discussed in 
Gans (n 39) 531–6. 
 48 See Harris (n 8) 24–30. 
 49 See, eg, Bennett v Police (SA) (2005) 239 LSJS 465 (‘Bennett’); Hillstead v The Queen [2005] 
WASCA 116; R v SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258; Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; R v 
Lawless [1974] VR 398; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676. Cf R v Smith [2011] 2 Cr App R 16. 
 50 Ghebrat v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 140, 143 [15], 145 [25] (Tate JA) (‘Ghebrat’). 
 51 The only time questions were raised was in the dissenting opinion of Madden CJ in Parker  
(n 37) 154–5. See also obiter in Tang (n 10) 713–15 [145]–[155] (Spigelman CJ). 
 52 See, eg, Parker (n 37). See also the diachronic response to bite mark evidence discussed in D 
Michael Risinger, ‘Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being 
Left on the Dock?’ (2000) 64(1) Albany Law Review 99, 135–43. 
 53 Bennett (n 49) 465 [5] (Doyle CJ). And, that the examiner ‘was qualified to express the 
opinion that he gave’: at 465 [5] (Doyle CJ); that the two fingerprints were ‘identical, and 
came from the same person’: at 465 [6] (Doyle CJ). 
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admissibility, legal reliance, the lack of successful challenges and  
convictions — were all used as proxies for reliability to lend epistemic 
legitimacy to the field.54 Oriented to the courts, latent fingerprint examiners 
substituted legal recognition and reliance for scientific insight into actual 
abilities and limitations.55 
Finally, it is useful to locate the exchanges in JP in the context of 
Australian admissibility jurisprudence. We do not contest the admissibility of 
opinions about latent fingerprints in some form.56 However, no Australian 
court requires, or has required, evidence of validity or demonstrable ability as 
part of its expert opinion admissibility practice.57 Few Australian criminal 
courts require details about procedures, assumptions and reasoning.58 Legal 
interest has focused on relevance, training and experience, perceived value, 
past legal practice and so forth.59 Rather than provide a prophylactic against 
unreliability, misrepresentation and exaggeration, our admissibility 
jurisprudence relies heavily on trial safeguards available to the defendant and 
the abilities of decision-makers. Weak admissibility jurisprudence places a 
 
 54 This is unfortunate because courts are not in a position to test or lend meaningful epistemic 
imprimatur: see above n 9; IMM (n 26) 315 [52] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 55 So-called ‘co-production’: see Sheila Jasanoff (ed), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of 
Science and the Social Order (Routledge, 2004). 
 56 Even using reliability-based admissibility standards: see Gary Edmond, ‘Specialised 
Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating  
Expert Opinion Evidence’ (2008) 31(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1 
(‘Specialised Knowledge’). 
 57 Tang (n 10) 712 [137] (Spigelman CJ); Chen (n 9) [62] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Schmidt and 
Campbell JJ). The only real exception was the Victorian Court of Appeal briefly requiring 
trial judges to consider reliability under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (before the High 
Court decision in IMM (n 26)) in Tuite (n 10) 200–1 [10] (Maxwell ACJ, Redlich and 
Weinberg JJA). Cf IMM (n26), discussed in Gary Edmond, ‘Icarus and the Evidence Act: 
Section 137, Probative Value and Taking Forensic Science Evidence “at Its Highest”’ (2017) 
41(1) Melbourne University Law Review 106 (‘Icarus and the Evidence Act’). 
 58 See, eg, Bennett (n 49) 474–5 [54]–[56] (Doyle CJ). But see Makita (n 24); Dasreef Pty Ltd v 
Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588, 622–3 [91], 628 [101], 636 [123] (Heydon J) (‘Dasreef ’); Davie 
(n 24) 40 (Lord President Cooper) (in a different jurisdiction). Note the reference to the 
plurality’s judgment in Dasreef in JP (Appeal) (n 4) 455–6 [32]–[33] (Beech-Jones J), quoting 
Dasreef (n 58) 604 [37] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See 
generally Gary Edmond and Kristy A Martire, ‘Knowing Experts? Section 79, Forensic 
Science Evidence and the Limits of “Training, Study or Experience”’ in Andrew Roberts and 
Jeremy Gans (eds), Critical Perspectives on the Uniform Evidence Law (Federation Press, 
2017) 80. 
 59 See Martire and Edmond, ‘Rethinking Expert Opinion Evidence’ (n 16). See also Edmond 
and Martire (n 58). 
2019] Forensic Science Evidence and the Limits of Cross-Examination 17 
Advance Copy 
considerable burden on codes of conduct for expert witnesses and cross-
examination at trial. 
IV  I N T R O D U C I N G  JP  
JP was charged with an aggravated break, enter and steal, which occurred in 
Dubbo on 4 October 2014.60 The elderly occupants of a house woke to find a 
person in their bedroom rifling through drawers and items on the bedside 
table. The intruder was described by one of the occupants as young and ‘of 
teenager height’, and by the other as 15–17 years of age, wearing dark 
clothing.61 No other description of the offender was provided. 
A number of prints were recovered from the scene, including a palm print 
taken from an exterior surface and a partial print lifted from a jewellery box 
located in the bedroom.62 It is not clear from the record how JP came to be a 
suspect.63 However, a full set of prints was taken when he was interviewed on 
8 October 2014. Based on a ‘match’ decision, JP was subsequently charged 
with the offence and remanded in custody.64 
The matter was heard in the Dubbo Children’s Court commencing on 13 
January 2015. The defence challenged both the late service and admissibility 
of the Expert Certificate (or report)65 provided by a latent fingerprint 
examiner — a Detective Sergeant with the New South Wales Police Force (the 
‘NSW Police’).66 In his Expert Certificate, dated 18 December 2014, the 
examiner describes comparing the prints recovered from the scene with the 
fingerprint impressions taken on 8 October 2014.67 He ‘identified’ the latent 
print on the jewellery box ‘to the Left Thumb of [JP]’.68 The police prosecutor 
 
 60 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 449 [1] (Beech-Jones J); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 112(1)–(2). 
 61 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 450 [8] (Beech-Jones J). 
 62 Ibid 450 [9] (Beech-Jones J). 
 63 ‘A preliminary examination of the prints led to the police forming a suspicion that JP and 
another male committed the break-in’: ibid 450 [9] (Beech-Jones J). 
 64 The suspected co-offender was arrested and charged on 16 October 2016. 
 65 See Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 177. 
 66 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 450–1 [11] (Beech-Jones J). 
 67 The redacted Expert Certificate is reproduced as an appendix to Edmond, Martire and San 
Roque (n 23) 627. 
 68 Ibid 629. For reasons that were never made entirely clear, he was not the first or only latent 
fingerprint examiner to analyse and compare the latent print with JP’s prints: see Transcript 
of Proceedings, R v JP (Children’s Court of New South Wales, Magistrate Mijovich, 27 
January 2015) 10 (‘JP (Trial transcript) (27 January)’). Precisely why so many different people 
were involved and who evaluated and who ‘verified’ the result are unclear. Backstage 
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accepted that the fingerprint evidence was, in effect, the only evidence against 
JP and that without it the prosecution must fail.69 The Magistrate rejected the 
defence applications, and the hearing proceeded with the Expert Certificate 
admitted into evidence. The latent fingerprint examiner was cross-examined 
across the three days of the hearing (13, 15 and 27 January 2015). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on 27 January 2015, the Magistrate agreed 
that the only evidence capable of identifying JP as the offender was the 
fingerprint evidence.70 Accepting the conclusion that the thumbprint was 
deposited by JP, and discounting discrepancies between the eyewitness 
descriptions and the appearance of JP, he found the offence proven.71 
JP appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court under pt 5 of the Crimes 
(Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) by way of summons filed on 5 May 
2015.72 The grounds included a challenge to: the admissibility of the latent 
fingerprint evidence (grounds 1 and 6); the adequacy of the reasons for the 
decisions to admit the evidence and find JP guilty (grounds 2 and 4); the 
Magistrate effectively delegating decision-making responsibility to the latent 
fingerprint examiner (grounds 5 and 8); and that the evidence was insufficient 
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt (ground 9).73 The appeal was heard in 
Sydney on 6 October 2015. Beech-Jones J granted leave to raise grounds 6 and 
8, but rejected all other grounds and dismissed the summons.74 He further 
refused leave to allow the defence to raise matters relating to s 135 and s 137 
of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), since there had been no objection at trial.75 
V  CO M PA R I N G  EX P E RT  T E S T I M O N Y  W I T H  SC I E N T I F IC  
KN O W L E D G E  
In this section it is our intention to juxtapose the testimony received in JP 
with authoritative scientific reviews of latent fingerprint evidence — our 
 
practices are not transparent and it is impossible to understand exactly how ACE-V is 
practised from the Expert Certificate and testimony. 
 69 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 450–1 [11] (Beech-Jones J). 
 70 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 30. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 Part V of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) provides for an appeal as of right 
on matters of law, and requires leave for appeal on matters of fact, or mixed law and fact: at  
ss 52–3. 
 73 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 460–8 [50]–[91] (Beech-Jones J). 
 74 Ibid 468 [93]. 
 75 Ibid 463 [62]–[63]. It is very unlikely that these would have made any difference, for the 
reasons explained in Edmond, ‘Icarus and the Evidence Act’ (n 57). 
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‘benchmark’. This enables us to observe how scientific knowledge, even when 
raised, may not influence legal decision-making. Indeed, in this particular 
trial — unusual because the procedures and the ability to make a positive 
identification were ‘contested’ — the latent fingerprint evidence was presented 
in a way that did not incorporate, or even acknowledge, fundamental 
scientific research and derivative recommendations. Instead, the dogma of 
fingerprints as effectively irrefutable evidence of identity was espoused and 
accepted. The judicial officers observed nothing that raised either a reasonable 
doubt or warranted public expression of concern. 
The following sub-sections draw upon reports produced by the NRC,76 the 
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (the ‘NIST’), and the 
Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry (the ‘SFI’). (The NIST produced the Latent Print 
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems 
Approach report (the ‘NIST Report’),77 and the SFI produced the The 
Fingerprint Inquiry Report (the ‘SFI Report’).78) These reports, and the 
associated inquiries, were conducted and published in the decade before the 
trial and appeal. The NRC Report was prepared by a subcommittee of the  
 Academy following a request and appropriation from Congress.79 The 
Academy was established during Lincoln’s presidency, is independent from 
government, and is one of the world’s most prestigious scientific 
organisations.80 The NIST is a US federal agency responsible for, among other 
things, metrology and the provision of standards.81 These reviews were 
dominated by scientists, engineers and statisticians. The SFI, on the other 
hand, was a public inquiry overseen by a senior judicial officer following 
mistaken identifications by a Scottish fingerprint bureau.82 The reports, 
particularly the seminal report by the NRC, exposed a limited research base 
and openly questioned the value of many forensic science procedures. 
 
 76 NRC Report (n 8). 
 77 NIST Report (n 46). 
 78 Sir Anthony Campbell, The Fingerprint Inquiry Report (Report, December 2011) (‘SFI 
Report’). 
 79 NRC Report (n 8) xix. 
 80 Ibid iii. 
 81 ‘About NIST’, NIST (Web Page, 14 June 2017) <https://www.nist.gov/about-nist>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/L6LQ-2CHR>. 
 82 SFI Report (n 78) 5. 
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A  Introduction to ACE-V 
To begin, it is useful to provide a brief introduction to ACE-V, the procedure 
used by latent fingerprint examiners in Australia, the US, Canada and the 
United Kingdom (‘UK’), among others. The following description is taken 
from the NRC Report: 
The technique used to examine prints made by friction ridge skin is described 
by the acronym ACE-V: ‘Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification.’ It 
has been described in forensic literature as a means of comparative analysis of 
evidence since 1959. The process begins with the analysis of the unknown 
friction ridge print (now often a digital image of a latent print). Many factors 
affect the quality and quantity of detail in the latent print and also introduce 
variability in the resulting impression. … 
… 
If the latent print does not have sufficient detail for either identification or 
exclusion, it does not undergo the remainder of the process (comparison and 
evaluation). These insufficient prints are often called ‘of no value’ or  
‘not suitable’ for comparison. Poor-quality known prints also will end the 
examination. … 
Visual comparison consists of discerning, visually ‘measuring,’ and 
comparing — within the comparable areas of the latent print and the known 
prints — the details that correspond. The amount of friction ridge detail 
available for this step depends on the clarity of the two impressions. The details 
observed might include the overall shape of the latent print, anatomical 
aspects, ridge flows, ridge counts, shape of the core, delta location and shape, 
lengths of the ridges, minutia location and type, thickness of the ridges and 
furrows, shapes of the ridges, pore position, crease patterns and shapes, scar 
shapes, and temporary feature shapes (eg, a wart). 
At the completion of the comparison, the examiner performs an evaluation 
of the agreement of the friction ridge formations in the two prints and 
evaluates the sufficiency of the detail present to establish an identification 
(source determination). Source determination is made when the examiner 
concludes, based on his or her experience, that sufficient quantity and quality 
of friction ridge detail is in agreement between the latent print and the known 
print. Source exclusion is made when the process indicates sufficient 
disagreement between the latent print and known print. If neither an 
identification nor an exclusion can be reached, the result of the comparison is 
inconclusive. Verification occurs when another qualified examiner repeats the 
observations and comes to the same conclusion, although the second examiner 
may be aware of the conclusion of the first. … 
2019] Forensic Science Evidence and the Limits of Cross-Examination 21 
Advance Copy 
… Note that the ACE-V method does not specify particular measurements 
or a standard test protocol, and examiners must make subjective assessments 
throughout.83 
B  Scientific Method? ACE-V, Standards and Subjectivity 
1 Authoritative Scientific Findings and Recommendations 
The NRC Report and the NIST Report provide independent reviews of ACE-V. 
Both openly questioned its value as a rigorous (scientific) method, as well as 
its ability to support positive identification of suspects and eliminate errors:84 
ACE-V provides a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge 
analyses. However, this framework is not specific enough to qualify as a 
validated method for this type of analysis. ACE-V does not guard against bias; 
is too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee 
that two analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons, 
merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a 
scientific manner or producing reliable results. A recent paper by Haber and 
Haber presents a thorough analysis of the ACE-V method and its scientific 
validity. Their conclusion is unambiguous: ‘We have reviewed available 
scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method and found none.’85 
Subsequent research, undertaken after 2009, established the foundational 
validity of latent fingerprint comparison.86 This relatively limited research 
base also provided, for the first time, an indication of the frequency  
of errors.87 
 
 83 NRC Report (n 8) 137–9 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). See also PCAST Report  
(n 12) 88–90; William Thompson et al, American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis — Latent Fingerprint 
Examination (Report No 2, 15 September 2017) 95–8 (‘AAAS Report’). 
 84 See also Glenn Langenberg, ‘A Performance Study of the ACE-V Process: A Pilot Study to 
Measure the Accuracy, Precision, Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of 
Conclusions Resulting from the ACE-V Process’ (2009) 59(2) Journal of Forensic 
Identification 219. 
 85 NRC Report (n 8) 142–3 (citations omitted), quoted in NIST Report (n 46) 9, 124. 
 86 Bradford T Ulery et al, ‘Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions’ 
(2011) 108(19) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 7733; Ulery et al, ‘Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent 
Fingerprint Examiners’ (n 43); Tangen, Thompson and McCarthy (n 22). 
 87 See below Part V(C)(1). 
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The NRC and the NIST accepted that fingerprint comparison performed 
using the ACE-V process offers a potentially valuable means of assisting with 
identification. They were, however, vitally concerned with the validity of the 
procedure, the performance of examiners, and accuracy. The committees 
responsible for these reviews insisted on the need for rigorous standards 
around quality and sufficiency of prints, match decisions, verification, 
documentation and so forth. Standards provide important safeguards because 
of the subjective nature of latent fingerprint comparison: 
At every step in the ACE-V process, human factors can affect the outcome. … 
Subjectivity is an inextricable part of the process. In the Analysis phase, for 
example, accurate identification of the characteristics that make prints of value 
depends on the examiner’s knowledge, training, and experience. Likewise, in 
the Comparison phase, variable factors, such as the elasticity of skin and 
uneven pressure, mean that there will never be perfect congruence between 
two prints, even if they originate from the same source. The examiner must 
resolve the question of whether there is sufficient agreement ‘within tolerance.’ 
… [T]he examiner at least implicitly relies on a sufficiency threshold to resolve 
that question, and in setting this threshold, the examiner draws on professional 
knowledge and experience. There is little research at present that provides 
objective metrics for determining these tolerances.88 
The lack of meaningful standards and its implications for practice were 
canvassed in the NIST Report. On the threshold for deciding whether a latent 
fingerprint is ‘sufficient’ for comparison, for example: 
The Working Group found no research that explicitly addresses utility or 
sufficiency in the context of latent print analysis. … Opening the box to study 
the process of judgment in every phase of ACE-V would provide the empirical 
foundation from which to develop best practices for each part of the process.89 
2 Responses to the Cross-Examination in JP 
Now we turn to compare these assessments with the testimony in JP. 
Consider the following exchange: 
Defence Counsel: Do you agree that because the ACE-V technique depends on 
your capability as a human being to make observations and make subjective 
decisions that it is actually vulnerable to a number of sources of error? 
 
 88 NIST Report (n 46) 8. 
 89 Ibid 204. 
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Fingerprint Examiner: Again if ACE-V is done correctly and by a person in the 
right mind and with the correct tools and apparatus I don’t believe that there 
would be an error.90 
At trial, ACE-V was described not only as effective, but effectively error-free. 
In this response, the subjective nature of the process is elided, as the (not 
entirely responsive) answer asserts that procedure and mindset provide 
safeguards against error. 
Elsewhere, the witness acknowledged some of the subjective aspects of his 
analysis, comparison and evaluation:91 
Defence Counsel: Is it predominantly the case that you’re using your own eyes 
to make observations and then draw conclusions from what you perceive? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes with the — also in the software there are the ability 
to put marker points on the impressions as well and then yes it is just with my 
own eyes. 
Defence Counsel: I’m going to suggest to you that a conclusion that a pair of 
impressions come from the same source depends on the ability of the examiner 
to [analyse] and compare the impressions is that right? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that is correct.92 
Such concessions sit awkwardly against the contention that ACE-V is 
effectively error-free. 
C  Error and Error Rates 
1 Authoritative Scientific Findings and Recommendations 
Consider now the NRC’s conclusions about error — specifically in relation to 
latent fingerprint examiners applying ACE-V: 
Errors can occur with any judgment-based method, especially when the factors 
that lead to the ultimate judgment are not documented. Some in the latent 
print community argue that the [ACE-V] method itself, if followed correctly 
(ie, by well-trained examiners properly using the method), has a zero error rate. 
 
 90 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 12. 
 91 See Bradford T Ulery et al, ‘Changes in Latent Fingerprint Examiners’ Markup between 
Analysis and Comparison’ (2015) 247 Forensic Science International 54. 
 92 Transcript of Proceedings, R v JP (Children’s Court of New South Wales, Magistrate 
Mijovich, 13 January 2015) 33 (‘JP (Trial transcript) (13 January)’). 
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Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic, and, moreover, it does not lead to a process 
of method improvement. The method, and the performance of those who use 
it, are inextricably linked, and both involve multiple sources of error (eg, errors 
in executing the process steps, as well as errors in human judgment).93 
All subjective, or judgment-based, procedures are vulnerable to error.94 
Because errors are a feature of all processes involving humans, and 
particularly those involving human interpretation, the NRC recommended 
that latent fingerprint examiners — and other forensic scientists — should 
take immediate steps to measure and disclose uncertainty and accuracy:95 
All results for every forensic science method should indicate the uncertainty in 
the measurements that are made, and studies must be conducted that enable 
the estimation of those values. … 
… [T]he accuracy of forensic methods resulting in classification or 
individualization conclusions needs to be evaluated in well-designed and 
rigorously conducted studies. The level of accuracy of an analysis is likely to be 
a key determinant of its ultimate probative value.96 
Among its many virtues, measuring error and uncertainty enables examiners 
to improve their individual performance, to collectively standardise and to 
refine procedures.97 It also enables them to provide decision-makers with the 
means of evaluating match opinions. Only when we are provided with an 
empirically-based indication of how often examiners make mistakes (in 
conditions resembling, though not necessarily identical to, those encountered 
in the case) are we in a position to rationally attribute a probative value or 
weight to their opinions.98 
In discussing error, it is helpful to introduce a more recent report prepared 
by the US President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (the 
 
 93 NRC Report (n 8) 143 (emphasis added); see also at 142–5, 149. 
 94 See generally Linda T Kohn, Janet M Corrigan and Molla S Donaldson (eds), To Err Is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System (National Academy Press, 2000). See also Itiel E Dror 
and Simon A Cole, ‘The Vision in “Blind” Justice: Expert Perception, Judgment, and Visual 
Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition’ (2010) 17(2) Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 161. 
 95 The NIST Report (n 46), as its full title implies (Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: 
Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach), was entirely oriented to addressing risks 
raised by human factors. 
 96 NRC Report (n 8) 184; see also at 122. 
 97 See ibid 183–4; PCAST Report (n 12) 95–6. 
 98 See David L Faigman, John Monahan and Christopher Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) 
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81(2) University of Chicago Law Review 417, 
453–6. 
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‘PCAST’), titled Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific 
Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (the ‘PCAST Report’).99 This 
particular report, published after the trial and appeal, was not available to the 
parties in JP. Nevertheless, this report explicitly builds upon, and adds further 
authoritative support to, the conclusions reached by the NRC and the NIST. 
The PCAST Report was produced, at President Obama’s invitation, by some of 
the most eminent scientists in the US. It documents the results of a 
comprehensive review of the scientific research, that had been performed by 
late 2016, in order to assess seven forensic feature comparison procedures, 
including latent fingerprint comparison. 
The PCAST Report endorsed the NRC Report, including its concerns about 
ACE-V.100 In its review of research undertaken since 2009, the PCAST Report 
concluded that properly trained latent fingerprint examiners possess genuine 
expertise.101 Studies confirmed that latent fingerprint examiners can match 
and discriminate between prints, and have a tendency to err on the side of 
finding prints not to match (false negatives), rather than falsely matching 
non-matching prints (false positives).102 These findings presumably come as a 
relief to both fingerprint examiners and legal institutions in the aftermath of 
the NRC Report and the NIST Report. The PCAST Report was not, however, a 
complete endorsement of the claims and practices of the latent fingerprint 
community. For, in addition: 
PCAST finds that latent fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid subjective 
methodology — albeit with a false positive rate that is substantial and is likely to 
be higher than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about 
the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate could be as high 
as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI study and 1 error in 18 cases based on 
a study by another crime laboratory. In reporting results of latent-fingerprint 
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates based on properly 
designed validation studies.103 
 
 99 PCAST Report (n 12). 
 100 Ibid 101–2; NRC Report (n 8) 142–3. 
 101 PCAST Report (n 12) 87–97. 
 102 See, eg, Ulery et al, ‘Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions’  
(n 86). 
 103 PCAST Report (n 12) 9–10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also at 87–103. The 
PCAST Report stressed: ‘Examiners have sometimes testified, for example, that their 
conclusions are “100 percent certain;” or have “zero,” “essentially zero,” or “negligible,” error 
rate. … [H]owever, such statements are not scientifically defensible: all laboratory tests and 
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The PCAST insists that without insight into error, generated through well-
designed validation studies, decision-makers are deprived of the means to 
evaluate the probative value of (or assign weight to) the examiner’s opinion.104 
2 Responses to the Cross-Examination in JP 
When we turn to JP, the contrast between authoritative scientific advice and 
the responses provided during cross-examination is stark. Although multiple 
reviews by scientific organisations have concluded that claims about 
infallibility and a zero error rate are ‘clearly … unrealistic’105 and ‘not 
scientifically plausible’,106 the witness does not accept the possibility of error. 
Rather, he reiterates the discredited contention that the ACE-V procedure, 
properly applied, is error-free: 
Defence Counsel: Do you agree that there are a number of potential sources of 
error associated with your ACE-V technique of fingerprint examination and 
identification? 
Fingerprint Examiner: If the ACE-V methodology is done correct I don’t agree 
that there’s potentially error rates there.107 
When pressed, the examiner asserted that he does not make mistakes — even 
if, on rare occasions, others might: 
Defence Counsel: Is it possible that you have made a mistake or mistakes in 
your examination of fingerprint impressions in this case? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I haven’t. 
Defence Counsel: Is it possible that you’re wrong about the accused being the 
source of the fingerprint impression in W3? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’m not. 
Defence Counsel: In every case in which you’ve identified a latent print to a 
known print have you been a hundred per cent certain? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes I have. 
 
feature-comparison analyses have non-zero error rates’: at 3. See also NRC Report (n 8)  
142–5; NIST Report (n 46) 21–38; SFI Report (n 78) 602–32. 
 104 PCAST Report (n 12) 96. 
 105 NRC Report (n 8) 143. 
 106 Ibid 142. 
 107 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 12. 
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Defence Counsel: You’ve never had any doubt? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Never.108 
And: 
Defence Counsel: You agree don’t you that fingerprint examination and 
identification is subject to human error? 
Fingerprint Examiner: There’s always an element of human error in anything 
we do. 
Defence Counsel: But you say because of the method that you use that you’re 
always right when you make an identification is that what you say? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Me personally yes. 
Defence Counsel: So you would say that the ACE-V method is infallible is that 
what you say? 
Fingerprint Examiner: In the correct — used in the correct method and way 
and by myself yes.109 
The examiner is unwilling to accept that, even though ACE-V is an inherently 
subjective procedure and fundamentally dependent on human interpretation, 
it is vulnerable to error. His answers rely heavily on personal opinion and 
claimed abilities. 
Defence counsel later endeavoured to question the witness directly on the 
NRC’s findings: 
Defence Counsel: The [NRC] report also concludes in relation to fingerprint 
comparisons that, 
Errors can occur with any judgment based method especially when the 
factors that lead to the ultimate judgment are not documented, some in 
the latent print community argue that the method itself if followed 
correctly ie: by well trained examiners properly using the method has a 
zero error rate. Clearly this assertion is unrealistic and moreover it does 
not lead to a process of method improvement. The method and the 
performance of those who use it are inextricably linked and both involve 
multiple sources of error, for example errors in executing the processed 
steps as well as errors in human judgment. 
 
 108 Ibid 11. 
 109 Ibid 12–13. 
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Are you aware of that part of the report? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’m not. 
Defence Counsel: Do you dispute that conclusion of the United States National 
Academy of Science? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Parts of it yes I do. 
Defence Counsel: Which parts? 
Fingerprint Examiner: The parts that say by a well trained examiner properly 
using the method has a zero error rate. 
Defence Counsel: You agree there is an error rate do you? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Not if the ACE-V method is used correctly. 
Defence Counsel: So you say that the zero error rate [sic] if a well trained 
examiner uses ACE-V method? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Is zero yes that’s correct. 
Defence Counsel: So you refuse to acknowledge that it’s possible that you made 
a mistake in this case? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I did not make a mistake in this case that’s correct. 
Defence Counsel: I tender the extract of the report your Honour. 
EXTRACT OF REPORT TENDERED. OBJECTION.110 
The witness’s response prevented the defence from tendering and relying 
upon extracts from these authoritative reports as evidence. The prosecutor’s 
objection, premised on the impropriety of tendering a report not recognised 
as authoritative, insulates the fingerprint examiner from criticism and 
deprives the Court of access to mainstream scientific knowledge.111 
The rejection of the possibility of individual error is curious, because the 
examiner appears to eventually concede that fingerprint examination has an 
error rate, even though we are not always able to determine when an error has 
been made: 
Defence Counsel: Do you agree it’s not possible to calculate the error rate for 
latent fingerprint identification because the truth is not known? 
 
 110 Ibid 16. 
 111 See Edmond, Hamer and Cunliffe (n 8). 
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Fingerprint Examiner: If you put it that way yes.112 
This concession seems to imply that ACE-V might not be an infallible 
method. 
When prompted, the fingerprint examiner also acknowledged the 
existence of ‘documented’ errors in his field: 
Defence Counsel: In practise we do not know how often examiners say that two 
fingerprints match when they actually come from two different people, do you 
agree with that? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Unless it’s documented that’s correct. 
… 
Defence Counsel: And so in practise in the latent fingerprint field, do you agree 
that we don’t know how often examiners say that two fingerprints match when 
they actually come from two different people? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Well it all comes down to documentation, if it’s 
documented we’ll know, if it’s not documented we don’t know.113 
Within the broader context of the cross-examination, ‘documentation’ seems 
to refer to high profile false identifications, such as those relating to Mayfield 
and McKie.114 But the possibility of error (as disagreement) also emerges 
when the witness is pushed about disagreement within NSW Police: 
Defence Counsel: In your experience how often does a second or subsequent 
expert in the crime scene section or the FSG [Forensic Services Group] come to 
a different conclusion to an earlier examiner? 
Fingerprint Examiner: It is rare but it does happen when an erroneous 
identification has been made.115 
 
 
 112 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 12. 
 113 Ibid 19–20. 
 114 Brandon Mayfield was implicated in the 2004 Madrid train bombings based on a mistaken 
fingerprint ‘match’ provided by the FBI: Office of the Inspector General, US Department of 
Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Report, March 2006). 
Shirley McKie was a Scottish detective accused of perjury on the basis of mistaken 
fingerprint evidence. The events led to the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry: SFI Report (n 78). 
 115 Transcript of Proceedings, R v JP (Children’s Court of New South Wales, Magistrate 
Mijovich, 15 January 2015) 24 (‘JP (Trial transcript) (15 January)’). 
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And: 
Defence Counsel: Have you ever disagreed with another fingerprint examiner 
about whether two fingerprint impressions are from the same source or not? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I haven’t. 
Defence Counsel: Never? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Only when — on a working basis no but I have been 
asked to review a person who has made an erroneous identification.116 
Personal experience with ‘rare’ cases of erroneous identification does not alter 
the examiner’s testimony or confidence in his own performance. His 
testimony might be taken to suggest that NSW Police’s internal verification 
processes are robust and that all, or most, errors are identified. However, it 
provides no basis to assess how often errors occur, including how often both 
evaluation and verification are mistaken. 
On the issue of police errors, we should not overlook the fact that 
resolving the question of whether an identification is ‘erroneous’ is based on 
undisclosed internal police processes. In the absence of ground truth, 
disagreement is resolved through private discussion and consensus, or 
perhaps via ex cathedra pronouncements handed down by examiners with 
more experience or seniority. In addition, we have no independent way of 
knowing this particular witness’s performance or error rate across his many 
years of service.117 In the absence of a calculated error rate, his assertions of 
error free performance are merely ipse dixit. Moreover, we have no evidence 
that this particular examiner is better or worse than other latent fingerprint 
examiners, including those with considerably less experience and those he 
characterises as more error-prone.118 The studies reviewed by the PCAST 
provide the only reliable evidence on error rates currently available. The 
institutions responsible for producing latent fingerprint evidence do not 
 
 116 JP (Trial transcript) (13 January) (n 92) 38; see also at 36. 
 117 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 11–12. The reason is because we do not know the 
ground truth. 
 118 See Rachel A Searston and Jason M Tangen, ‘The Emergence of Perceptual Expertise with 
Fingerprints over Time’ (2017) 6(4) Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 
442. In some domains, performance accuracy and years of experience are not strongly 
correlated: see, eg, David White et al, ‘Passport Officers’ Errors in Face Matching’ (2014) 9(8) 
Plos One e103510:1–6. 
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appear to apply systematic, transparent and effective methods for detecting, 
documenting, resolving or disclosing disagreement and error.119 
D  Expression: The Meaning of Match Decisions 
1 Authoritative Scientific Findings and Recommendations 
Historically, latent fingerprint examiners, and many other forensic scientists, 
have exaggerated the strength of their methods, abilities and conclusions. In 
Part V(C)(1) we saw how the PCAST recommends incorporating an 
indication of error in the reporting of results.120 Prior to these studies, the 
NRC Report, the NIST Report and the SFI Report had all recommended that 
latent fingerprint examiners should moderate the expression of results, 
because the leap from a conclusion that two areas of friction ridge ‘match’, to 
positive identification of a specific individual, is not supported by the 
available research. 
Consider the following findings and recommendations: 
At present, fingerprint examiners typically testify in the language of absolute 
certainty. … Given the general lack of validity testing for fingerprinting; the 
relative dearth of difficult proficiency tests; the lack of a statistically valid model 
of fingerprinting; and the lack of validated standards for declaring a match, 
such claims of absolute, certain confidence in identification are unjustified … 
Therefore … fingerprint identification experts should exhibit a greater degree 
of epistemological humility. Claims of ‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ identification 
should be replaced by more modest claims about the meaning and significance 
of a ‘match’.121 
And: 
[A] fingerprint identification was traditionally considered an 
‘individualization,’ meaning that the latent print was considered identified to 
one finger of a specific individual as opposed to every other potential source in 
 
 119 We do not contend that there was any disagreement in JP, but then there would probably be 
no official record (or disclosure, at least) if there had been. 
 120 The AAAS Report (n 83) endorses the need for further research on possible errors by 
examiners in the ‘short run’, until ‘quantitative methods for estimating the probative value or 
weight of fingerprint evidence’ are developed: at 5, 22. 
 121 NRC Report (n 8) 142, quoting Jennifer L Mnookin, ‘The Validity of Latent Fingerprint 
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate’ (2008) 7(2) Law, Probability & Risk 
127, 139. 
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the universe. However, the recent attention focused on this issue reveals that 
this definition needlessly claims too much, is not adequately established by 
fundamental research, and is impossible to validate solely on the basis of 
experience. … [E]xaminers should not claim to be able to exclude every other 
finger in the world as a potential source. Rather, an identification decision 
suggests a substantial enough similarity that the examiner believes that the two 
impressions originated from a common source.122 
The Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry recommended: 
Examiners should discontinue reporting conclusions on identification or 
exclusion with a claim to 100% certainty or on any other basis suggesting that 
fingerprint evidence is infallible.123 
More recently, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (the 
‘AAAS’) concluded: 
Latent print examiners traditionally claimed to be able to ‘identify’ the source 
of a latent print with 100% accuracy. These claims were clearly overstated and 
are now widely recognized as indefensible.124 
2 Responses to the Cross-Examination in JP 
Working against the clear consensus that emerges from authoritative scientific 
research and systematic reviews from the US and UK, the examiner identified 
JP as the source of the crime scene print: 
Defence Counsel: And do I understand correctly that in your opinion the 
crime scene fingerprint matches the accused’s fingerprint to the exclusion of all 
other people? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that is correct. 
Defence Counsel: So is it your opinion that the accused is the only possible 
source for the fingerprint impression recovered from the crime scene at W3? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes. 
Defence Counsel: What’s your level of confidence in relation to that opinion? 
Fingerprint Examiner: 100 per cent. 
 
 122 NIST Report (n 46) 72. 
 123 SFI Report (n 78) 740. 
 124 AAAS Report (n 83) 9. 
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Defence Counsel: You’re a hundred per cent certain about that conclusion? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes I am.125 
Evidently oblivious to scientific consensus, this examiner expresses his 
conclusion in a manner that has been expressly disapproved in every 
authoritative scientific review of latent print examination.126 His testimony 
misrepresents the strength of latent fingerprint evidence and the magnitude  
of error. 
The NIST Report was prepared by a working group composed of eminent 
scientists, lawyers and some of the most senior latent fingerprint examiners in 
the US. When presented with its recommendation, the examiner steadfastly 
adheres to his opinion: 
Defence Counsel: One of the recommendations by the United States National 
Institute of Standards and Technology was this, ‘Because empirical evidence 
and statistical reasoning do not support a source attribution to the exclusion of 
all other individuals in the world latent print examiners should not report or 
testify directly or by implication to a source attribution to the exclusion of all 
others in the world.’ What do you say about that recommendation? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Well it’s someone’s opinion in America. 
Defence Counsel: Do you agree that your report and evidence today are not 
consistent with that recommendation? 
Fingerprint Examiner: If you are guided [by] that recommendation no they’re 
not consistent. 
Defence Counsel: In light of this recommendation do you stand by the opinion 
that you’ve given here that the crime scene fingerprint W3 can be attributed to 
JP exclusively? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes I can.127 
 
 125 JP (Trial transcript) (13 January) (n 92) 13–14; see also at 25–6. 
 126 These forms of expression are much more problematic than the notorious prosecutor’s 
fallacy whereby the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis, is mistaken for the 
probability of the hypothesis given the evidence: see William C Thompson and Edward L 
Schumann, ‘Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy 
and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy’ (1987) 11(3) Law and Human Behavior 167. 
 127 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 17, quoting NIST Report (n 46) 72 (Recommendation 
3.7). See also SFI Report (n 78) 740. This testimony (and the expression) is also inconsistent 
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This exchange is revealing. This examiner is unfamiliar with the NIST Report, 
and other scientific reports, on latent fingerprint analysis. And yet, in the 
context of a criminal proceeding, and with a fundamental duty to assist  
the Court impartially, he dismisses this authoritative recommendation  
as ‘someone’s opinion in America’.128 Unwilling to make any concession and, 
in effect, acting against the advice of peak scientific and technical 
organisations, the examiner (in his capacity as an expert and a representative 
of the state) declines an opportunity to reconsider his position and 
commitments or even to engage more deeply with the literature on which he 
is being cross-examined.129 
E  Bias, Blinding and Non-Blind Verification 
1 Authoritative Scientific Findings and Recommendations 
Historically, risks from human factors have been overlooked or discounted by 
forensic practitioners and courts.130 The NRC Report placed unprecedented 
emphasis on risks from cognitive bias: 
Two very important questions should underlie the law’s admission of and 
reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal trials: (1) the extent to which a 
particular forensic discipline is founded on a reliable scientific methodology … 
and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline rely 
on human interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the 
absence of sound operational procedures and robust performance standards.131 
Cognitive bias was also addressed by the NIST and the PCAST: 
Cognitive bias refers to ways in which human perceptions and judgments can 
be shaped by factors other than those relevant to the decision at hand. It 
includes ‘contextual bias,’ where individuals are influenced by irrelevant 
background information; ‘confirmation bias,’ where individuals interpret 
 
with the Australian standards for reporting forensic science testimony: Standards Australia, 
Forensic Analysis — Part 4: Reporting (Standard No AS 5883.4—2013, 2 May 2013). 
 128 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 17. 
 129 His position is also inconsistent with the (recently revised) advice of the International 
Association for Identification — a society established by fingerprint examiners and others 
more than a century earlier: Standardization II Committee, The Report of the International 
Association for Identification, Standardization II Committee (Report, 30 September 2010) 19. 
 130 See, eg, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Expert Witnesses (Report No 109, June 
2005) 70–5; White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott & Haliburton Co Ltd [2015] 2 SCR 182. 
 131 NRC Report (n 8) 9; see also at 43, 87, 111. 
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information, or look for new evidence, in a way that conforms to their pre-
existing beliefs or assumptions; and ‘avoidance of cognitive dissonance,’ where 
individuals are reluctant to accept new information that is inconsistent with 
their tentative conclusion. The biomedical science community, for example, 
goes to great lengths to minimize cognitive bias by employing strict protocols, 
such as double-blinding in clinical trials.132 
Concern with cognitive bias is integral to a full understanding of the strength 
of expert evidence. Cognitive bias may inadvertently affect the accuracy of 
human judgment even where experts are formally qualified, experienced and 
aware of the dangers. These risks have led biomedical researchers and 
physicists to routinely blind themselves to information that might influence 
their practices or analyses.133 Vulnerability to cognitive bias is not the result of 
dishonesty or inadequate training and experience: 
To recognize that latent print examiners are potentially subject to bias is not to 
single them out but rather to suggest that they are not exempt from those 
cognitive biases that all interpreters of data and information face.134 
On the basis of these insights, the NIST Report offered advice and 
recommendations on how to manage information and work practices to 
reduce the threat posed to forensic science evidence. Among the NIST’s 
recommendations, the following was prominent: 
Procedures should be implemented to protect examiners from exposure to 
extraneous (domain-irrelevant) information in a case.135 
 
 
 
 
 132 PCAST Report (n 12) 31. See also NIST Report (n 46) 43–4. 
 133 Blinding protects participants, investigators, analysts and reviewers from information and 
suggestions that might influence their judgments (eg another analyst’s conclusion). See Itiel 
E Dror et al, ‘Letter to the Editor — Context Management Toolbox: A Linear Sequential 
Unmasking (LSU) Approach to Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic Decision Making’ 
(2015) 60(4) Journal of Forensic Sciences 1111. 
 134 NIST Report (n 46) 40. 
 135 Ibid 44 (Recommendation 3.3). See also the discussion on the impact that extraneous 
information can have on individuals: at 10–12. See also SFI Report (n 78) 741 
(Recommendations 6–8). 
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Similar recommendations were made by the PCAST,136 the AAAS137 and the 
US National Commission on Forensic Science (established in response to the 
NRC Report).138 The US National Commission recommended that: 
1 FSSPs [forensic science service providers] should rely solely on task-relevant 
information when performing forensic analyses. 
2 The standards and guidelines for forensic practice being developed by the 
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) should specify what types 
of information are task-relevant and task-irrelevant for common forensic tasks. 
3 Forensic laboratories should take appropriate steps to avoid exposing analysts 
to task-irrelevant information through the use of context management 
procedures detailed in written policies and protocols.139 
Because the risk of contextual and other unconscious biases ‘cannot be 
dismissed’, the NIST recommended documentation and disclosure in the 
absence of blinding.140 Accordingly, expert reports ‘should reveal the context 
of the examination by describing or referring the reader to the information 
about the case that an examiner received’.141 
2 Responses to the Cross-Examination in JP 
The fingerprint examiner, and those verifying his decision, were all 
unnecessarily exposed to domain-irrelevant information (ie task-irrelevant 
information). Notwithstanding a lack of familiarity with relevant research  
and revised procedures, the fingerprint examiner downplayed well-
documented risks: 
Defence Counsel: Do you claim to be immune to any form of bias in your work 
as a fingerprint examiner? 
Fingerprint Examiner: In my own mind yes. 
Defence Counsel: Are you familiar with the term cognitive bias? 
 
136 PCAST Report (n 12) 10. 
 137 AAAS Report (n 83) 7–8, 35–6. 
 138 National Commission on Forensic Science, Reflecting Back: Looking toward the Future 
(Report, 11 April 2017) 1–2, 6. See also NRC Report (n 8) 191. 
 139 National Commission on Forensic Science, Ensuring That Forensic Analysis Is Based upon 
Task-Relevant Information (Adopted Views of the Commission, 8 December 2015) 1–2. See 
also PCAST Report (n 12) 10–12. 
 140 NIST Report (n 46) 97. 
 141 Ibid. 
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Fingerprint Examiner: I’ve heard of the term but I’m not quite familiar with it 
exactly what it means no. 
Defence Counsel: Are you familiar with the concept of contextual bias? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Again I’ve heard that term but I’m not familiar with the 
actual wording of it. 
Defence Counsel: What’s your understanding of the term contextual bias? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Well not exactly contextual bias but bias is that 
something is put in front of you and it leads you to a determination. 
Defence Counsel: Are you familiar with the term ‘domain irrelevant 
information’? 
… 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’ve never heard of that term.142 
And: 
Defence Counsel: And are you saying that there was no role to play for 
confirmation bias when you came to identify W3 with JP’s left thumb in 
circumstances where you had all that information? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Again I say that that information from those people is 
purely a hypotheses [sic] and it’s up to me to either confirm or deny that 
hypotheses [sic]. 
Defence Counsel: So okay you wouldn’t agree with this proposition, that there 
were a number of pieces of information that you had when you undertook your 
examination in this case of W3 and JP’s left thumb impression, that mean you 
were susceptible to confirmation bias? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I wouldn’t agree with that. 
Defence Counsel: Are you aware of the scientific literature in relation to 
fingerprint examination and identification being vulnerable to a number of 
forms of bias? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I am aware that there is bias involved or can be involved. 
Defence Counsel: Including when ACE-V is used? 
 
 142 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 4. 
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Fingerprint Examiner: If ACE-V is used correctly bias shouldn’t be taken into 
account at all.143 
Here, the witness conveys some awareness that ‘bias … can be involved’.144 
Nevertheless, he rejects the possibility of bias and error in relation to his own 
performance. For example, he testifies that because a match by another 
examiner is treated as a ‘hypothesis’, it does not pose a risk of biasing his 
judgment when reviewing the decision. This is a good example of a seemingly 
plausible claim that is in fact inconsistent with scientific research and 
mainstream scientific advice.145 The examiner, whether he realises it or not, is 
susceptible to both contextual bias (eg suggestion) and confirmation bias, 
when he conducts his examination with prior knowledge of the judgment of 
another examiner. No scientific research suggests that the risk posed by bias 
can be avoided by treating potentially biasing information or processes as a 
‘hypothesis’ — particularly in the absence of any procedures designed to seek 
and document both disconfirmatory and confirmatory information.146 
Biomedical researchers and physicists do not employ ‘hypotheses’ to 
circumvent the risks posed by cognitive bias. Rather, they employ  
procedures that eliminate the dangers by blinding themselves to domain-
irrelevant information. 
When questioned about two notorious studies of cognitive bias — by Dror 
and his colleagues147 — the examiner indicates some awareness but cannot 
offer any assistance.148 These studies showed that experienced fingerprint 
examiners reversed their opinion about whether two prints matched when — 
unbeknown to them — they were asked to compare the same prints in 
different circumstances.149 On the second occasion they were exposed to  
 
 
 
 143 Ibid 10–11. 
 144 Ibid. 
 145 The NRC Report (n 8) warned that ‘ACE-V does not guard against bias’: at 142. 
 146 A point partially addressed by linear ACE-V, which was not used in this case: see PCAST 
Report (n 12) 101. 
 147 Itiel E Dror and David Charlton, ‘Why Experts Make Errors’ (2006) 56(4) Journal of Forensic 
Identification 600; Itiel E Dror, David Charlton and Ailsa E Péron, ‘Contextual Information 
Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications’ (2006) 156(1) Forensic 
Science International 74. 
 148 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 5–7. 
 149 See above n 147. 
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suggestive information about the source of the prints. When asked about 
these studies: 
Defence Counsel: That demonstrate even experienced latent fingerprint 
examiners can change their mind? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Well I couldn’t say exactly what ones but that comes 
down to the personal opinion of that person.150 
It is unclear what the examiner means when he asserts that these studies are a 
matter of ‘personal opinion’. Does he mean the personal opinion of the 
authors of the study, or those of the examiners who participated? In either 
sense, his response reveals a lack of familiarity with this research and its 
implications for practice. These studies confirm that experienced fingerprint 
examiners are vulnerable to suggestion and confirmation bias, to the point 
where they can be induced to contradict their own previous match decisions. 
Cognitive bias may influence interpretations even when the examiner is 
experienced and honest, and even when they are aware of the dangers. It can 
be difficult to effectively cross-examine a witness on the subject: How does 
one cross-examine a witness about subtle influences on cognition that may 
operate below the level of consciousness? Even though it might be possible to 
question a witness about generic dangers or procedures that might have been 
implemented to avoid the risks, the issue cannot be meaningfully explored 
where, as in JP, the witness is not sufficiently conversant with the concept of 
cognitive bias.151 
F  Uniqueness 
1 Authoritative Scientific Findings and Recommendations 
Claims that objects are unique, or that they leave unique traces, are ubiquitous 
among comparison forensic science communities. Firearms are said to leave a 
unique mark on a bullet casing or projectile; teeth are said to leave unique bite 
marks; and, faces, voices, gait, handwriting, tools and fingerprints have each 
been said to be unique.152 Uniqueness has a special salience because, in 
theory, if an object or a trace is unique and can be unequivocally matched to a 
particular source (eg a specific gun or a given suspect), then questions about 
 
 150 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 5. 
 151 Ibid 4, 9–11. 
 152 See Saks and Koehler (n 41) 206 nn 29–35. 
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its origin or identity are resolved. However, claims to uniqueness 
tremendously simplify the complexities of comparison and the implications of 
similarities between a trace and its suspected source. Consider the following 
assessment by the PCAST: 
[U]niqueness studies miss the fundamental point. The issue is not whether 
objects or features differ; they surely do if one looks at a fine enough level. The 
issue is how well and under what circumstances examiners applying a given 
metrological method can reliably detect relevant differences in features to 
reliably identify whether they share a common source. …  
Moreover, it is not necessary for features to be unique in order for them to 
be useful in narrowing down the source of a feature. Rather, it is essential that 
there be empirical evidence about how often a method incorrectly attributes 
the source of a feature.153 
And, the assessment by the AAAS: 
The scientific literature does not, however, provide an adequate basis for 
assessing the rarity of any particular feature, or set of features, that might be 
found in a fingerprint. Examiners may well be able to exclude the 
preponderance of the human population as possible sources of a latent print, 
but there is no scientific basis for estimating the number of people who could 
not be excluded and there are no scientific criteria for determining when the 
pool of possible sources is limited to a single person.154 
2 Responses to the Cross-Examination in JP 
The proposition that fingerprints are unique is commonly presented and 
widely understood as unshakeable fact.155 It is tightly coupled to how 
fingerprint identification was initially conceptualised and explained. We can 
observe the commitment to uniqueness and the work it does for categorical 
identification in the following interactions: 
Defence Counsel: Officer is your opinion about the match between [JP’s] 
impression and the crime scene impression based on an assumption that no 
human being throughout history has identical fingerprints? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that is correct. 
 
 153 PCAST Report (n 12) 62 (emphasis in original). See also NRC Report (n 8) 143–5. 
 154 AAAS Report (n 83) 5; see also at 21. 
 155 See Saks and Koehler (n 41). 
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Defence Counsel: That’s commonly referred to as the uniqueness of human 
fingerprints is that right? 
Fingerprint Examiner: That is correct yes. 
Defence Counsel: The assumption that all human beings have unique 
fingerprints is a premise relating to the friction ridge skin is that right? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that’s correct.156 
… 
Defence Counsel: So do you accept that it’s impossible to say that every human 
being has a unique set of fingerprints? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I accept that they are all unique. 
Defence Counsel: Do you accept that it’s impossible to say that each digit or 
finger belonging to all the human beings throughout history are unique as 
against every other digit? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I don’t accept that.157 
Reliance upon the uniqueness of fingerprints operates as something of a 
smokescreen — it is likely to mislead or confuse those who are not familiar 
with scientific approaches to forensic feature comparison procedures. 
Ironically, it has had this effect on many among the latent fingerprint 
community, and we can see its effects in these and other exchanges. 
The problems spill over into the frequency of fingerprint features (or 
minutiae). The examiner acknowledged that he does not know about the 
frequency and interrelatedness of features: 
Defence Counsel: Do you agree that you cannot give evidence about the actual 
frequency of particular characteristics or combinations of characteristics in 
fingerprints in the human population? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes. 
Defence Counsel: For example you can’t give evidence about the frequency of 
left loops or double loops on fingers generally? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Not the frequency no. 
 
 156 JP (Trial transcript) (13 January) (n 92) 24; see also at 25. 
 157 Ibid 26. 
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Defence Counsel: I may have all ready [sic] asked a question about this in 
relation to analysis but in relation to the evaluation phase again it’s based on the 
subjective view of each individual examiner is that right? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that is correct.158 
Given this lack of baseline information, positive identification represents a 
leap of faith from a match decision.159 
Significantly, the examiner acknowledged differences between the latent 
print and JP’s known print. These apparent differences were characterised  
as explicable:160 
Defence Counsel: How many differences did you detect between the 
impressions? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Nil. 
Defence Counsel: Are you saying that the two impressions were absolutely 
identical? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’m not, what I’m saying is that there was nil 
unexplainable differences. 
… 
Defence Counsel: So do I understand your evidence correctly that you did 
discern some differences between the two impressions but all of the differences 
that you discerned you explained away? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes that is correct. 
Defence Counsel: Is it possible that there was a difference between the 
impressions that you were unable to detect? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Between the two impressions? 
Defence Counsel: Yes? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Unable to detect you said? 
 
 158 Ibid 35–6. 
 159 See generally Jonathan J Koehler and Michael J Saks, ‘Individualization Claims in Forensic 
Science: Still Unwarranted’ (2010) 75(4) Brooklyn Law Review 1187. 
 160 The failure to disclose such differences in reports was also excused in Bennett (n 49): at  
474–5 [54]–[58] (Doyle CJ). There is a misguided tendency to describe the latent  
and reference prints as identical. There are always differences. 
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Defence Counsel: Unable to observe or detect, unable to perceive? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Well I did not perceive any unexplainable differences.161 
According to the examiner, ‘apparent’ differences are created by the 
circumstances of deposition and collection, rather than differences between 
the actual finger(s) responsible for the two prints. These observable 
differences were not documented and are resolved entirely in the examiner’s 
head. The decision as to whether a difference is real or explicable is a 
subjective interpretation with considerable import. There is nothing in ACE-
V that addresses this issue and no standards around whether differences 
should be understood as real or artificial.162 
The ideological (or metaphysical) commitment to uniqueness does not 
address or overcome the subjective nature of the interpretation, or the 
established fact that some fingerprints from different persons appear to be 
very similar and have been mistakenly matched.163 
G  Training, Continuing Education and Familiarity with Pertinent Scientific 
Research 
The previous extracts suggest that the fingerprint examiner has not engaged 
with mainstream scientific research, criticisms and recommendations. 
Accordingly, it is useful to consider his testimony about efforts to remain 
abreast of pertinent developments in the field and what this testimony might 
reveal about NSW Police training and continuing education: 
Defence Counsel: Do you keep abreast of the current available scientific 
research in relation to fingerprint identification? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I read available documentation that I have at Dubbo 
Crime Scene when time permits.164 
 
 161 JP (Trial transcript) (15 January) (n 115) 4–5; see also at 6–9, 12–14. See also JP (Trial 
transcript) (13 January) (n 92) 33–4. 
 162 PCAST Report (n 12) 5–6, 143. 
 163 See JP (Trial transcript) (13 January) (n 92) 24–6. Historians and philosophers of science 
have explained how metaphysical commitments structure the ways in which one 
conceptualises; for influential work in this area, see Thomas S Kuhn, The Copernican 
Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Harvard University 
Press, 1957); E A Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Dover 
Publications, 2003). 
 164 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 5. 
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… 
Defence Counsel: Do you stay up to date with the science related to fingerprint 
examination identification? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I read documents that are sent to me by the training 
area periodically.165 
… 
Defence Counsel: Is it your evidence that in relation to your expertise and 
staying up to date with the fingerprint field you basically rely on whatever the 
New South Wales Police training section sends to you? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Updated versions and methodology yes. 
Defence Counsel: You don’t do anything of your own initiative to remain up to 
date in the field, is that right? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Unfortunately time does not permit within my area.166 
The examiner’s responses indicate that he relies upon the NSW Police 
training section to identify the information he needs in order to perform his 
role, and that his workload inhibits continuing education. Cross-examination 
revealed that neither he, nor the NSW Police training section, appear to 
consider familiarity with authoritative scientific research as being important 
to his role as an expert. Consider the following: 
Defence Counsel: You’re of course aware aren’t you sergeant of the United 
States National Academy of Science Report, ‘Strengthening the Forensic 
Sciences in the United States: A Path Forward’, published in 2009? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I haven’t read that document. 
Defence Counsel: Not aware of it at all? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No.167 
… 
Defence Counsel: Following the 2009 report of the National Academy of 
Science there was a review carried out by the United States National Institute of 
 
 165 Ibid 13. 
 166 Ibid 18. 
 167 Ibid 14. 
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Standards and Technology in relation to latent fingerprint evidence, are you 
aware of that? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’m not. 
Defence Counsel: 2012 they released their report ‘Latent Print Examination 
and Human Factors: Improving the Practise Through A Systems Approach’ and 
they made a number of recommendations, are you aware of that? 
Fingerprint Examiner: No I’m not. 
Defence Counsel: You’re not aware of major international reporting and 
recommendations in your field of expertise, is that what you’re saying? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I don’t go searching for that information if the — if our 
training area feels that it is deemed necessary to know they send the 
appropriate literature to read.168 
These interactions are revealing. A significant proportion of the very modest 
Expert Certificate prepared for the proceedings in JP refers to the examiner’s 
training and experience and the various short courses he had attended. While 
this Expert Certificate asserts that he is an expert in the field of latent 
fingerprint examination and refers to his ‘specialised knowledge’,169 the cross-
examination introduces uncertainty about its scope.170 
This latent fingerprint examiner, the senior examiner in the region, is 
unaware of perhaps the most important developments in the field over its 
100-year history. He is unaware that the ACE-V procedure, which he 
describes as infallible, was not formally tested until after 2009. He does not 
seem to be familiar with the results of these studies and the indicative error 
rates they generated. This is important. The reports and studies are not merely 
some ‘journal’ article or ‘someone’s opinion in America’.171 Rather, they are 
vitally important scientific reviews produced by multidisciplinary teams of 
independent scientists and focus on the very methods employed by the latent 
fingerprint examiners of New South Wales (‘NSW’). These reports (and the 
research and methods they draw upon) challenge both the procedures and the 
conclusions produced by NSW latent fingerprint examiners. They challenge 
 
 168 Ibid 17. 
 169 Edmond, Martire and San Roque (n 23) 627. 
 170 See generally Thomas F Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line 
(University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
 171 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 17. 
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the scope of the witness’s expertise and are incompatible with his opinion  
and testimony. 
When some of these inconsistencies are brought to the attention of the 
witness, he does not defer or take the opportunity to reflect upon his training 
and commitments: 
Defence Counsel: Do you dispute that conclusion of the United States National 
Academy of Science? 
Fingerprint Examiner: On the grounds of fingerprints I would yes. 
… 
Defence Counsel: Do you dispute that conclusion of the United States National 
Academy of Science? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Under the current methodology of New South Wales 
Police yes I do.172 
In JP, the state called a fingerprint examiner who was neither scientifically 
trained nor conversant with scientific research, scientific advice, and 
methodological and other problems with his procedures. He was incapable of 
providing a framework through which to make sense of his opinion — an 
opinion on the ultimate issue in the proceedings. 
H  The Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses 
The fingerprint examiner signed an Expert Certificate stating that he was 
familiar with the Expert Witness Code of Conduct (the ‘Code’)173 and 
acknowledging that his primary obligation was to impartially assist the 
Court.174 The preceding discussion might help the reader to appreciate the 
limitations of the Code (and similar normative frameworks) for witnesses who 
lack fundamental knowledge of their ‘field’. The exchange below suggests that, 
notwithstanding the Code, this latent fingerprint examiner did not consider it  
 
 
 
 172 Ibid 15. Consider the expert testimony admitted in Commissioner for Government  
Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292, despite the cross-examination revealing the 
expert’s limited knowledge and unsupported claims: at 303 (Menzies J). 
 173 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) sch 7 (‘Expert Witness Code of Conduct’). 
 174 Edmond, Martire and San Roque (n 23) 628. 
2019] Forensic Science Evidence and the Limits of Cross-Examination 47 
Advance Copy 
his duty to disclose uncertainty, concerns, or criticism of his procedure or  
the field: 
Defence Counsel: You understand that you have an overriding duty to assist the 
court and to do that impartially? 
Fingerprint Examiner: Yes I do. 
Defence Counsel: And part of acting impartially as an expert witness involves 
disclosing the existence of uncertainty, concern or criticism in your particular 
field, do you agree with that? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I would — if I had that uncertainty within the case that I 
was looking at I would definitely disclose that. 
Defence Counsel: You don’t consider your role as an expert in acting 
impartially and assisting the court to inform the court about a general level of 
uncertainty, concern or criticism in your field. Is that what you’re saying? 
Fingerprint Examiner: I don’t think it would be my duty as a witness in a 
particular case to do that.175 
The Code stipulates that an expert should disclose ‘any qualification … 
without which the report is or may be incomplete or inaccurate’.176 The 
previous exchange suggests that this examiner, even if he was familiar with 
the scientific research, limitations and uncertainties regarding latent print 
examination, would not have disclosed them.177 It suggests that the only 
qualifications the witness would disclose are personal (or subjective) doubts 
in relation to a particular comparison or conclusion. This interpretation of the 
Code — along with belief in the infallibility of the ACE-V method and the 
naive contention that he has never made a mistake — is used to insulate the 
examiner from having to refer to any research or criticisms, or to make 
disclosures. As he testified in passages reproduced earlier, whenever the 
examiner reports a match he experiences no doubts, and so there will never 
be a need to disclose any limitations — however critical or destabilising. 
 
 175 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 13–14; see also at 25. See also JP (Trial transcript) (13 
January) (n 92) 25. 
 176 Expert Witness Code of Conduct (n 174) s 3(j). On the implications for admissibility, see 
Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581, 619–20 [728]–[731] (McClellan CJ at CL); Chen 
(n 9) [20]–[23], [34], [72] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Schmidt and Campbell JJ). 
 177 The witness seems to believe that it is the responsibility of the defence to identify limitations 
and uncertainties. 
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The previous exchange, and the testimony as a whole, captures the 
superficial manner in which the Code tends to inform the practice and 
disclosure made by the state’s forensic scientist. If a witness does not know 
about, understand or accept mainstream scientific research, criticisms and 
recommendations, then, on this witness’s interpretation of the Code, there is 
no need to refer to them. 
This section begs the question of what it means for a witness to be, or hold 
themselves out to be, impartial (or even expert) if they are not conversant 
with, or do not disclose, authoritative, rigorously conducted research directly 
related to their procedures and abilities.178 The rules of evidence accord expert 
witnesses a special status on the premise that they offer knowledge-based and 
impartial assistance to the court. In JP, answers provided during cross-
examination are expressed and defended in ways that systematically advance 
the state’s accusation while departing from what is actually known. 
VI  I N J U D IC IO U S  CR E D U L I T Y:  LE G A L  EVA LUAT IO N  O F  T H E  
LAT E N T  FI N G E R P R I N T  ‘EV I D E N C E’  
In this section, we consider the Magistrate’s reasoning before moving on to 
discuss issues flowing from this reasoning and the cross-examination. Let’s 
begin with the actual decision (upheld on appeal).179 Two important 
observations frame our analysis of this decision. At trial, JP’s case was heard 
by a magistrate. That is, a judicial officer who does not have the time and 
resources available to judges more senior in the court hierarchy. Secondly, the 
scientific materials raised by the defence were not in evidence. With these 
constraints in mind, what follows are the formal findings on the evidence 
presented at trial: 
I accept that fingerprints may be unreliable, may be affected by bias. I accept 
that two experts can have a disagreement or a different opinion on a set of 
fingerprints. I accept historically errors appear to have been made. 
In this matter I have oral and written evidence from [the fingerprint 
examiner]. His evidence was unshaken on his view as to the matching of the 
thumbprint of [JP]. In my view I disagree with the submissions in this matter, 
he has given sufficient evidence in these proceedings as to how he reached that 
determination. As an expert his expertise was not shaken, his opinion was not 
 
 178 See Supreme Court of Victoria, Practice Note No 2 of 2014: Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, June 2014, 4 [4.2]. It requires the expert to disclose disagreement and controversies. 
 179 JP (Trial) (n 3). 
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shaken. He is tasked, as he said, purely to compare W3 to [JP’s] prints. There is 
clearly in terms of the procedures involved, checks and balances in place. He 
acknowledged he is aware of case studies where potential impacts and bias of 
proceedings have occurred. His view as the expert in the field or presented as 
the expert in this matter is that where the appropriate procedures have taken 
place, [it] is unlikely to have those errors occur. He also conceded that he had 
not read a lot of the literature referred to by [counsel for the defence] in the 
cross-examination. Again he maintained his view that if protocol was followed 
properly it should not involve bias or incorrect assessment. 
The difficulty of course with a lot of material that was cross-examined on is 
there is no method, no chance to actually test the validity of those arguments. I 
note that a lot of that material, there is a report there from 2008 or 2009 but I 
do not have the actual name in front of me, and a follow up report in 2012 
provided to judicial bodies of the United States. There is no evidence of any 
action taken on those views by those researchers or otherwise. The report from 
Scotland does not take it any further than his opinions being on the balance of 
probabilities that would assist further inquiries. No great depth as to what the 
actual error was and how that could potentially relate to the matter in this 
matter. 
I have no evidence before this Court of the method used in this instance by 
[the fingerprint examiner] … (not transcribable)… helping assist in his 
determination was tainted by the bias or other incorrect assessment by not 
following the protocols. I have no expert evidence on the defence showing in 
this particular matter that the thumbprint is not or could not be the accused’s. I 
say that of course there remains at all times the prosecutions responsibility to 
prove the matter beyond reasonable doubt. It was suggested that [the 
fingerprint examiner] was contradictory or failed to make proper concessions, I 
actually find to the contrary. He answered appropriately in all circumstances 
especially where the questions were extremely open-ended and hypothetical. 
He did not attempt in any way to make his evidence or his position any greater 
than what it should in terms of the protocols that were involved. 
It is put to the Court that the judicial officer could not assess the prints 
from the photos that are presented. It is not this Court’s role to be the expert, 
that is why the police call an expert to give their opinion and why, if required 
the defence call an expert as to why it is not, it is not the Court’s role to look at 
the various rigors and make a determination and even [the fingerprint 
examiner] on his own evidence indicated he needed specialist equipment to be 
able to identify it.  
The evidence by [the fingerprint examiner] in giving his opinion in 
determination has not been proved forensically challenged in this matter. There 
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is no Court decisions making such material unacceptable. … At best I have 
nothing else binding before me that would exclude the evidence of [the 
fingerprint examiner]. I can only scrutinise it on the material before me specific 
to this case. I accept [the fingerprint examiner’s] evidence in that regard. 
… 
I said anything is possible but is it probable? It is [improbable] that a person 
with the same thumbprint is in the Dubbo area and has entered the subject 
premises. Taking into account historically — and I agree with the defence 
submissions about the lack of a worldwide data base for eternity — taking into 
account historically there is no record of two persons with the same print and 
there may be, it may come up in the future but at this stage I can only take 
judicial notice of what is out there at the moment. That [there were] two 
persons with the same print in existence at the same time in Dubbo is highly 
improbable and that another person would be at those premises. I have no 
other evidence as to how the thumbprint came to be on that jewellery case in 
the circumstances that it was examined and identified. I need to determine 
beyond reasonable doubt, not a hundred percent and whilst hypothetically 
some doubt has arisen in my view there is no reasonable doubt in this 
matter.180 
His Honour found the offence proven.181 The reasons appear to accept that 
identification by fingerprint may be ‘unreliable’, ‘affected by bias’ and that 
‘errors appear to have been made’ in other cases.182 Further, they record that 
the witness ‘acknowledged … case studies where potential impacts and bias … 
have occurred’.183 The Magistrate accepts the fact, though perhaps not the 
implications, of there being no ‘worldwide data base for eternity’.184 Formal 
recognition of these risks and uncertainties is tempered by the availability of 
the Expert Certificate (or report) and the positive responses obtained during 
cross-examination and re-examination. 
In evaluating the latent fingerprint evidence, the Magistrate seems to 
assume that procedural anomalies and limitations — such as lack of 
 
 180 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 28–30. See also Bennett (n 49), where the 
Magistrate’s superficial engagement with the expert witness supposedly ‘exposed [the 
expert’s] method of working’: at 467 [16] (Doyle CJ); and ‘fully informed [the Magistrate] of 
the reasoning process’: at 474 [54] (Doyle CJ). 
 181 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 30. 
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standards, non-disclosure of an indicative error rate, and exposure to 
domain-irrelevant information — exert no influence on the examiner’s 
conclusion. For the Magistrate, the witness’s ‘expertise was not shaken’ and 
‘his opinion was not shaken’.185 Remarkably, his ‘opinion’ was reported as  
‘not … forensically challenged’.186 He was recognised as an expert and his 
various opinions were accepted even though ‘he had not read a lot of the 
literature’.187 The examiner’s bare description of his procedure — visually 
comparing two prints on a computer screen — was characterised as 
‘sufficient’ explanation of the reasoning to support categorical 
identification.188 The Magistrate accepts that ‘clearly’ there were ‘checks and 
balances in place’, although he does not identify them or analyse their 
utility.189 The Magistrate accepts, indeed repeats, the ‘view’ that where ‘the 
appropriate procedures have taken place’ it is ‘unlikely’ that errors will 
occur.190 This evaluation relies on the claims of a latent fingerprint examiner 
and upon past legal practice but is insensitive to, and inconsistent with, 
scientific knowledge. 
The reasons allude to the authoritative scientific materials — the various 
reports that are not named in the Magistrate’s decision (or the appellate 
judgment). The Magistrate, who was in an undoubtedly invidious position, 
indicates that he was not able to ‘test the validity’ of the research and 
conclusions — which he characterises as ‘arguments’.191 Further, he holds that 
there was ‘no evidence of any action taken on those views’.192 There was no 
evidence led about the FBI having changed its practices (by adopting ‘linear 
ACE-V’) in response to the NRC Report and another inquiry, or about the US 
Federal Government establishing the National Commission on Forensic 
Science and a series of technical committees under the oversight of the NIST 
to undertake research and advise forensic science providers. The problem, of 
course, is that because the witness did not accept the authority of the NRC 
Report and the NIST Report, or their findings and recommendations, there 
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 189 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 29. 
 190 Ibid. 
 191 Ibid. 
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was, in effect, no evidence, apart from the examiner’s opinions, before  
the Court. 
As for the examiner, in response to the defence submission that he was 
‘contradictory or failed to make proper concessions’, the Magistrate found ‘to 
the contrary’.193 He was said to have answered ‘appropriately in all 
circumstances’ to questions derisively characterised as ‘extremely open-
ended’.194 Questions directed at his method and, its limitations, risks and 
errors, are treated as theoretical — things that are ‘possible’ but not 
‘probable’.195 Attempts to introduce materials that question the procedure and 
the witness’s impression were treated as ‘hypothetical’.196 However, the 
PCAST does not consider the concerns raised by the NRC (and the NIST) or 
the results of the scientific research it relies upon, to be theoretical, 
hypothetical or abstract issues somehow displaced from real world practice.197 
The fact that the research is general and not concerned with the contingencies 
of specific cases does not lead these scientists to dismiss the evidence of error 
as general or remote from practice.198 
The Magistrate displays a traditional and exclusive interest in the opinion 
presented in the instant case. The reasons communicate an expectation that 
the defence must identify an actual error.199 Again, this expectation is 
misguided, because scientific advice indicates that the examiner’s method is 
not known to eliminate errors. Furthermore, the NSW Police did not take any 
precaution against the risk of cognitive bias.200 Risk of error is invidious 
because, in most cases, the examiner and court will not know if it 
materialises. This is why the reports recommend validation and precautionary 
blinding.201 Apparently misunderstanding the nature of these dangers, the 
Magistrate seems to expect the defence to show that the ‘thumbprint is not or 
 
 193 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 29. 
 194 Ibid. 
 195 Ibid 30. 
 196 Ibid 29. 
 197 PCAST Report (n 12) 34–5, 65–6. 
 198 General studies do not prevent medical doctors from treating individual patients. Rather, 
knowledge of the general informs particular treatment decisions. 
 199 See below Part VII(A). 
 200 See Kaye N Ballantyne, Gary Edmond and Bryan Found, ‘Peer Review in Forensic Science’ 
(2017) 277 Forensic Science International 66. 
 201 See above Part V(E)(1). 
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could not be the accused’s’.202 The various concerns raised by the defence, but 
not accepted by the latent fingerprint examiner, are accordingly seen as 
inapposite or insignificant. In the absence of an identified error, the 
Magistrate accepts the latent fingerprint examiner’s opinion as proof of 
identity to the requisite standard. 
Reverting to uniqueness, the Magistrate takes ‘judicial notice’ of the fact 
that ‘there is no record of two persons with the same print’.203 The Magistrate 
is comforted by the fact that it is ‘improbable’ that two persons ‘with the same 
print’ would be in Dubbo.204 The reasons illustrate the failure to grasp the true 
issue at stake in this case. The question is how often latent fingerprint 
examiners match prints from different persons and how often they fail to 
match prints made by the same person. The question is one about the 
likelihood that fingerprints from two different people could be confused or are 
so similar as to be capable of being confused (and how similar they would need 
to be for this to take place). Uniqueness neither addresses nor overcomes this 
fundamental issue.205 Moreover, matching decisions may be biased by 
exposure to domain-irrelevant information; such as knowledge of the fact that 
the prints being compared both originated in Dubbo. A person who believes 
in uniqueness might be more likely to treat similarities in two prints from 
Dubbo as sufficient for identification than a person who does not know 
anything about the source of the prints they are asked to compare. What 
appears improbable (to the Magistrate) may contaminate the formation of the 
examiner’s opinion. This is how insidious cognitive bias can be.206 
Despite acknowledging the presence of some hypothetical doubt, the 
Magistrate is satisfied that ‘there is no reasonable doubt in this matter’.207 This 
 
 202 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 29. A similar expectation was present in Castleton 
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decision was upheld on appeal, where the Court accepted that there was ‘no 
material’ — ie admissible evidence — to affect the weight of the examiner’s 
opinion or his credibility.208 Moreover, according to the appellate court, the 
trial judge had the ‘distinct advantage’ of seeing the examiner’s demeanour: 
While a number of criticisms were made of [the fingerprint examiner’s] 
evidence it was open to his Honour to conclude that there was no material to 
indicate that, to the extent the criticisms were sustained, they materially 
affected the weight to be attached to [the fingerprint examiner’s] opinion that 
the fingerprints were identical. Otherwise his Honour had the distinct 
advantage of being able to observe [the fingerprint examiner] give evidence and 
respond to criticism.209 
This reasoning, and the dependence on admissible ‘evidence’, might be legally 
orthodox and considered reasonable by the appellate court and other lawyers 
and judges. However, we hope that readers will share our view that the 
insensitivity to scientific knowledge and, the disparities between scientific 
knowledge and the testimony, and reasoning, on display in this case  
are disquieting. 
VII  DI S C U S S IO N:  ER R O R  A N D  LE G A L  I G N O R A N C E 
To what extent is it fair to judge the quality of responses provided by a latent 
fingerprint examiner in the Children’s Court in Dubbo against a standard set 
by pre-eminent research scientists and government technical organisations? 
While we accept that cross-examination can be a formidable experience, we 
consider that an expert’s duty to provide impartial assistance to the court 
requires experts, and their institutions, to familiarise themselves with 
authoritative research and recommendations about their procedures and 
abilities. The issues we raise in this article are not new and yet the gaps, 
between the testimony and scientific knowledge, are substantial. The NRC 
Report was published in 2009, the SFI Report in 2011, the NIST Report in 
2012, and our own paper — ‘How to Cross-Examine Forensic Scientists: A 
Guide for Lawyers’, on which this challenge was partially based — was 
 
 208 JP (Appeal) (n 4) 468 [90] (Beech-Jones J). 
 209 Ibid. Of interest, there was no testimony that the prints were identical — rather, there were 
differences. The question was whether these non-identical fingerprints were produced by the 
same person: at 451–2 [14]–[21] (Beech-Jones J). 
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published in 2014.210 The NSW Police were (and remain) on notice about 
these, and other, scientific reports. Their main response to these critical 
reports, prior to the case and appeal, seems to have been to supplement their 
training materials with ‘readings’.211 Revealingly, the fingerprint examiner in 
JP testified that he was not aware of the scientific reports. His ignorance did 
not affect his certification and seniority, nor the accreditation of his bureau 
and the reports it routinely produces. Ignorance did not moderate his 
confidence or the expressed strength of his opinion. It did not affect judicial 
impressions of his credibility or the weight of his evidence, and did not render 
any of his evidence inadmissible — not even the parts based on his non-
scientific impressions, beliefs and speculation. 
The issues explored in this article are fundamental to practice, as well as 
the validity and scientific reliability of latent fingerprint evidence. It is not 
unreasonable to expect a forensic science practitioner, recognised as an expert 
witness, to remain abreast of scientific research on the very procedures they 
employ. The fact that the expert witness was incapable of addressing the 
questions being asked in cross-examination, combined with the Court’s 
inability to appreciate the significance of those questions and answers, would 
seem to be a fundamental problem. These are questions that the state should 
have been in a position to answer. It should have addressed many of them 
pre-emptively in the Expert Certificate (or report). Moreover, the state could 
have called other witnesses rather than rely on what were, in effect, dogmatic 
assertions given under the guise of expertise. The legitimacy of our criminal 
courts and investigative agencies depends on their ability to sensibly respond 
to scientific research and advice (as well as its absence).  
We now turn to consider two issues with systemic implications. We start 
with the expectation that the defence might be expected to identify an error, 
and the implications of that expectation on the accusatorial trial and the 
burden of proof, before moving on to consider legal ignorance. 
 
 210 Gary Edmond et al, ‘How to Cross-Examine Forensic Scientists: A Guide for Lawyers’ (2014) 
39(2) Australian Bar Review 174. 
 211 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 5–6. The NSW Police revised their reports in the 
aftermath of JP, but they do not provide any indication of error or convey the magnitude of 
risks. There has been legitimate debate over the appropriate way to report error and the 
applicability of studies to actual practice. These debates raise important issues, but the main 
point is the necessity of a good faith attempt to present an indicative error rate based on 
empirical studies rather than impressions, or the results of commercial proficiency tests. See 
PCAST Report (n 12) 10, 17, 55, 57–9; see especially at 57 n 133. To their credit, drawing on 
the PCAST Report, the Victorian Police report an indicative error rate of 0.17%. See also 
Edmond, Martire and San Roque (n 23). 
56 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 42(3):Adv 
Advance Copy 
A  Expecting the Defence to Identify an Actual Error 
The Magistrate stated: 
I have no expert evidence on the defence showing in this particular matter that 
the thumbprint is not or could not be the accused’s. I say that of course there 
remains at all times the prosecutions [sic] responsibility to prove the matter 
beyond reasonable doubt.212 
There does, however, seem to be an expectation that the defendant might, or 
could, have identified an error if one had been made. Yet, placing such a 
burden upon the defendant is inconsistent with orthodox accusatorial 
principles and practice.213 
Those accused of criminal offences, including those who are factually 
innocent, will almost never be in a position to demonstrate positively that a 
forensic practitioner made an error, especially where opinions are based on 
subjective feature comparisons.214 Errors will rarely be conspicuous on the 
documentary record. Identifying an error will usually require technical 
sophistication (and, in the context of the case, rigorous analysis). This will 
often be a necessary, though hardly sufficient, condition. The fact that 
collection, labelling, transportation, storage, processing, analysis, comparison, 
interpretation, verification and reporting occur remote in time and space 
from the defendant — and any expert assistance — merely accentuates the 
problem. Anaemic documentation, and the reluctant disclosure of protocols, 
procedures and notes, make it difficult, even for the technically proficient, to 
identify derogation, let alone improprieties and mistakes.215 The defendant 
depends on the state to use procedures that do not unreasonably introduce, or 
increase, the risk of difficult-to-detect errors.216 
 
 212 JP (Trial transcript) (27 January) (n 68) 29. 
 213 See Woolmington v DPP (UK) [1935] AC 462; Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50;  
X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92. 
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of Jama in this context: FHR Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the 
Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Report, May 2010) 32–8. See also Stephen T 
Goudge, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario (Report, 30 September 2008). 
 215 See Department of Health (WA), Ross Inquiry into PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA (Final 
Report, 2017). 
 216 See generally Antony Duff et al (eds), The Trial on Trial: Towards a Normative Theory of the 
Criminal Trial (Hart Publishing, 2007) vol 3, ch 3. For an argument focused specifically on 
forensic science evidence, see Gary Edmond and Andrew Roberts, ‘Procedural Fairness, the 
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The expectation that a defendant will identify an error, rather than 
requiring the state to eliminate the reasonable possibility of error, places the 
defendant at an evidentiary disadvantage and acute vulnerability in those 
cases where an error has been made. Difficulties are compounded where the 
procedures are subjective (ie interpretative). These take place in the 
examiner’s head. How then does the defendant demonstrate that an examiner 
is mistaken? How does the defendant ascertain if the subjective decision was 
influenced by cognitive factors that operate unconsciously? Practically, in the 
absence of information about the true perpetrator, how does an innocent 
defendant demonstrate that a difference deemed ‘explainable’ by an examiner 
(and explained away, if asked) is actually significant? 
The Magistrate’s emphasis on ‘attacking’ the fingerprint evidence ‘directly’ 
and the need to identify an error (or expert disagreement) trivialises the 
serious methodological problems raised by the defendant in JP. It values the 
subjective opinions of forensic practitioners — including those who lack 
knowledge about their procedures — above mainstream scientific research, 
advice and insights related to those very procedures.217 There was, as the 
cross-examination made clear, an error rate associated with the ACE-V 
procedure, and the procedure used in JP was performed in ways that have 
been shown to increase the likelihood of error. It was incumbent on the 
prosecution to eliminate the real possibility of error. Trial and appellate judges 
should explain the terms on which the criminal justice system is willing to 
engage with opinions and why, given the various problems raised (and the 
lack of other evidence in this case), reasonable doubt could be eliminated. 
Judicial reliance on an expert witness’s experience or confidence, or imputing 
a ‘failure’ to the defence, does not somehow repair procedures that have been 
demonstrated to have real frailties. 
Frailties and uncertainties associated with the use of procedures are not 
abstractions. They inform how we should understand results obtained using 
those very procedures.218 The value of opinions derived using ACE-V is 
informed by the results of formal evaluation. Their value should incorporate 
uncertainties, limitations and risks. To attribute a higher value than the results 
of formal evaluation can support is speculative.219 
 
 217 See, eg, NRC Report (n 8) 122. ‘The level of accuracy of an analysis is likely to be a key 
determinant of its ultimate probative value.’: at 184. See also PCAST Report (n 12) 9–10, 143. 
 218 See Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin (n 98). 
 219 We do not, for example, allow biologists to positively identify persons with DNA evidence. 
They are limited to probabilities derived from population genetics. 
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B  Ignoring Knowledge 
JP provides a clear example of why our current approach to authoritative 
scientific materials, including cross-examination on them, is unsatisfactory. It 
is unsatisfactory because it can deprive courts of the most reliable research 
available, in circumstances where a witness, recognised as an expert, is 
ignorant, obtuse or dishonest. In a context of shrinking resources and 
structural impediments to securing the services of a rebuttal witness, cross-
examination has become the primary means of challenging expert opinion 
evidence in criminal trials. Institutional (and individual) insensitivity to 
mainstream scientific research threatens both the fairness of proceedings and, 
in some cases, including some guilty pleas, the rectitude of outcomes. 
We have already recounted, in Part V(G), the fingerprint examiner’s 
reaction to the NRC Report and the NIST Report. He did not recognise their 
authority or accept their conclusions to the extent that they were inconsistent 
with ‘the current methodology of New South Wales Police’.220 In addition, the 
witness was asked about scientific research, by Itiel E Dror and colleagues, 
included within the current NSW Police training materials.221 Consider the 
Magistrate’s reaction to the witness’s limited familiarity with these materials: 
Magistrate: He hasn’t acknowledged their scholarly orders. He’s acknowledged 
they’re part of the [NSW Police training] module. That’s all that he’s 
acknowledged at this stage, he hasn’t read them, he doesn’t know them. He 
hasn’t said he knows them or has read the material or what level of expertise 
this court can rely on those articles. Some are in the preparation of a learning 
module as attachment, not as mandatory reading. Quite clearly I can base these 
modules ‘go have a read of this’. I didn’t see any relevance unless you can make 
specific relevance to the expert evidence I have before me of those articles. You 
can’t and I won’t allow it.222 
The line of questioning stalled. Even unfamiliarity with institutional training 
materials concerned with bias and error is not regarded as significant in 
relation to the credibility of the witness or the reliability of his testimony. The 
rules of evidence and this witness’s expressed ignorance deprived mainstream 
scientific materials of legal significance. We can observe the practical effects of 
these accusatorial practices in the judgments. The wide range of 
methodological problems raised in cross-examination are not treated as 
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evidence and so not considered epistemologically disruptive. In a formalistic 
way, rules of evidence and procedure permitted — perhaps even compelled — 
these judicial officers to represent the latent fingerprint examiner’s evidence  
as ‘unshaken’.223 
In the end, the best available scientific resources on latent fingerprint 
evidence were characterised as ‘fabulous information’,224 ‘someone’s 
opinion’,225 ‘documents which purport to be written by academics in the 
United States’,226 ‘arguments’,227 ‘hypotheticals’ and ‘potentials’ of unknown 
provenance and uncertain value:228 
Magistrate: How can I be convinced these are key scientific and international 
legal committees? These are reports published in a journal. I have a group of 
persons, scientists or otherwise that put something to the Department of 
Justice and I have a follow up report, a report on matters that this witness has 
conceded errors appear to have been made. Nothing before me that shows 
those errors could be attributed to exact errors in this type of matter. These are 
all hypotheticals, potentials, I don’t know which one of these experts can be 
taken as experts. 
I have no judicial bodies or relevant judicial Court decisions that say that 
these carry any weight whether for character or otherwise. There are thousands 
of reports, there are thousands of researches on so many topics worldwide and 
I admire the amount of work that’s gone into this in terms of presenting this 
material but I can’t see how these type of reports and this witness’ failure to 
read material that is not deemed by the appropriate authorities to be specific to 
his work or otherwise other than in the training journal there’s some reference 
to some matters. How this can be held against his character or how any weight 
can be held in this particular matter?229 
There was no reason to characterise the reports in such pejorative terms. They 
are, self-evidently, scientific reports from prestigious scientific and technical 
organisations authored by eminent committees of scientists (and others).230 
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In Aytugrul v The Queen, the High Court reiterated the longstanding 
expectation that issues with expert opinion evidence must be addressed at 
trial.231 Yet, there are relatively few practical means of introducing 
authoritative reports, relevant scientific research or, scientific insights on 
methods and practices, in criminal proceedings.232 Procedural difficulties are 
compounded by shrinking legal aid budgets and the difficulty of locating 
appropriately qualified, and potentially effective, rebuttal experts.233 Decision-
maker access to authoritative scientific materials should not be dependent on 
the training and proclivities of particular forensic practitioners, the 
prosecutor’s interpretation of their role, the initiative of defence counsel, or a 
third party’s impression of the need to commit additional public funding to 
provide an expert in a particular case.234 
Our admissibility regime is currently indifferent to the reliability of 
scientific and technical forms of opinion evidence.235 Commenting on civil 
litigation, in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (‘Dasreef ’), Heydon J insisted: ‘[T]he 
reasoning must be stated. The opposing party is not to be left to find out about 
the expert’s thinking for the first time in cross-examination.’236 Yet that is 
precisely what happened in criminal proceedings in JP. Notwithstanding 
Dasreef, Honeysett v The Queen237 and R v Tang,238 our criminal courts do not 
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actually require opinions to be based on identifiable knowledge, as opposed to 
belief, speculation and ipse dixit.239 
In an age of validation studies, error rates and likelihood ratios, legal 
institutions should no longer take the subjective opinions of latent fingerprint 
examiners on trust. By allowing ignorance to inoculate an expert witness 
against challenge, our courts deprive themselves of mainstream scientific 
knowledge.240 It is neither appropriate nor rational to prefer the impressions 
of individual examiners to systematic scientific research on their procedures 
and abilities. Our concern is that important epistemological issues were not, 
and are not, routinely considered at trial or on appeal (or in most plea 
negotiations). Ironically, traditional legal practices prevented the Court from 
accessing knowledge on the very issues they were required to decide.241 
Namely, what was the probative value of the latent fingerprint evidence and 
could it support guilt beyond reasonable doubt? 
VIII   C O N C LU SI O N  
In this article, we have sought to illustrate some of the limits to cross-
examination of expert evidence, and the institutional implications of those 
limits, through a detailed analysis of a recent trial (and appeal). Using extracts 
from the proceedings, we explained why cross-examination, and conventions 
around cross-examination, might not be a particularly effective means for 
elucidating knowledge or truth.242 
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In JP, rules and procedures impeded an unusually well-informed and 
prepared cross-examiner from penetrating the unsubstantiated beliefs and 
misinformation offered by an expert witness in response to a range of  
well-directed questions. Many of the answers provided during cross-
examination — ‘the evidence’ — were incompatible with scientific knowledge. 
The judicial officers who supervised and ultimately decided this case did not 
engage with the scientific research and reports raised by the defence. These 
judicial officers perceived nothing epistemologically (or institutionally) 
destabilising in the challenge made by the defence. The defence counsel’s 
attempts to introduce concerns with the reliability of the state’s evidence — 
including forensic science procedures and the expression of results — did not 
influence judicial reliance on that evidence at trial or on appeal. This article 
explains why existing rules and procedures do not guarantee the reliability of 
forensic science evidence or conditions conducive to its rational evaluation. It 
also illustrates how rules of evidence and procedure can prevent institutional 
learning. In the end, the opportunity for our criminal legal system, 
particularly the courts, to learn about the issues aired in authoritative 
scientific reports, and consider their implications for this and other criminal 
investigations and proceedings, was lost. This loss is particularly unfortunate 
because scientifically-informed challenges are exceptional within our criminal 
legal system. 
